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SOCIAL HISTORY

УДК 94(47)«1850/1917»:316.343-058«653»

V.A. Veremenko, I.A. Tropov

The Russian nobility in the context of modernization (2nd half of the XIX – early XX centuries)

Российское дворянство в условиях модернизации (вторая половина XIX – начало XX в.)

The article explores the changes in financial position, views and activities of the noblemen in modernization of Russia in the second half of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries. It is shown that the «Great reforms» of the 1860s-1870s led to radical changes in the position of the nobility and contributed to the growth of social tension in the country.

В статье рассматриваются изменения в финансовом положении, взглядах и положении дворян в условиях российской модернизации во второй половине XIX – начале XX веков. Показано, что «Великие реформы» 1860–1870-х гг. привели к радикальным изменениям в положении дворянства и способствовало росту социальной напряженности в стране.

Key words: Russia, the nobility, modernization, social changes, "oskudenie", the abolition of serfdom, "Great reforms".

Ключевые слова: Россия, дворянство, модернизация, социальные изменения, «оскудение», отмена крепостного права, «Великие реформы».

Year 1861 marked the beginning of a new historic era for Russia, named the era of modernization in historic literature [6; 10; 11; 3]. The process of modernization was consisted of numerous reforms in different fields of country's social life; the aim of modernization was to enhance the imperial status of Russia, as well as to succeed in the competition in economics, military sphere and technology.

That is not to say that the history of the reformist activities carried out by Russian autocracy is neglected by researchers. Nevertheless, the scientists' investigations were concentrated mainly on studying the special features of public policy in this or that sphere (the role of emperors and central and regional bureaucracy in making the management decisions; the mechanisms of the implementations of reforms, etc.), or on the study of institutional changes, that took place under the influence of these reforms.

Such approach enables us to study the specific nature of national administration in The Russian Empire as well as those formal rules and regulations, by means of which the autocratic authorities tried to construct social space and influence the character of social relations. But the question at issue is that such an approach doesn't allow to explore the people themselves – those citizens of The Russian Empire, who, whether they liked it or not, had to live in conditions of the intensive changes.

Moreover, the habit of estimating the reforms “on their own”, in the isolation from the sociocultural and psychological context, formed a new specific historiographical tradition, the main idea of which was to represent the reforms of the 1860s – 1870s as “halved”, “incomplete”, etc. [1; 26; 16]. Let us take a look at how the life of Russian nobility have been changing during the second half of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries, and how we can estimate the character and the consequences of “Great reforms” of the 1860s – 1870s within the framework of this social group.

The aim of these transformations was the modernization of the country, and, in particular, the formation in Russia such society where social classes wouldn't exist. In many of them – in judicial, municipal, military, etc. “the spirit of capitalism”, as Max Weber put it, was distinctly observed. In this case the point was that the rights and obligations of people were to be determined not just by being a member of a social class, but by owning the property or not owning one.

In accordance with this the whole traditional system of social connections and relations changed: on the one hand, the social mobility of people, previously constrained by social restrictions, increased, on the other hand the special position of previously privileged groups was destroyed. Regarding this we absolutely agree with A. Riber's opinion, who claimed, that the reforms of the 60s-70s “created new, more complexly organized society” [14, p. 69]. In other words the changes used to happen during a short period of time affected the life of every person and put the representatives of different social groups into completely unusual living conditions.

Perhaps the most striking changes happened in the life of the nobility, whose representatives were found in extremely complicated economic situation just before the abolition of serfdom and “couldn't live in a way typical for the representatives of this social class” [9, p. 63].

After the reform of 1861 the nobility found itself in new economic conditions: first of all, the landowners couldn't use the forced labor of serf peasants as before, and second of all, under the influence of inner and outer factors the price of bread significantly decreased in the 1860s [13, p. 45–46]. Also strong damage was caused to the landowners' economy during the World Agrarian Crisis that struck Russia in the 1880s – 1890s.

Clearly the noblemen were affected by economic problems to different degrees. Their reaction to impetuous changes in the everyday life also varied greatly. Some representatives of this social class managed to modernize their businesses by means of more effective capitalist production, as it for instance happened in Perm' undivided estate owned by the Count Stroganov [19, p. 41–42]. A. N. Engelhardt, a famous public figure and agricultural chemist, a member of a noble family, once said that there were “various changes” in the late 1880s, and in some other landlords' estates “multiple crop rotations were introduced, various kinds of bread, as well as clover were planted” [4, p. 596]. The progressive landowners took a stand for the wide use of civilian labor and even for the future transition to farming. However, they mentioned that “this method is too expensive and doesn't correspond to the real prices of bread” [13, p. 49].

Many of them aspired to if not the transformation then at least to the preservation of their family estates. S.M. Wolkonsky's memoirs show that he demonstrated great love and care when it came to the questions of improvement of his estate: “There used to be a desert here that you wanted to be apart from, and now you see beautiful meadows, framed by the wavy lines of a forest edge. We call this territory Alexander Park. From my bedroom windows I look through binoculars at this scenery that I created. A different country. Is it really Tambov steppe? Undulated country, oak, birch and spruce forests; and tilled grain field between the groves... That is the kind of creative work that attaches a man to a place” [25, p. 34–35].

During the post-reform years the tendency of involving the noblemen into the entrepreneurship was distinctly noticeable. Though it suggested serious financial risks, it at the same time provided possibilities for high revenues, that were hard to obtain from landowner's estate. Some merchants from the nobility were the only proprietors of the industrial enterprises; others were engaged in collective commercial establishments – corporate share enterprises and merchant ventures [2, p. 107–117]. And even though in such large center as Saint-Petersburg noblemen by birth accounted only 18% of the corporate share enterprises management staff [17, p. 144], this still indicates their active participation in the processes of the bourgeois modernization of the country.

At the same time it cannot go unnoticed that the rationalization and intensification of landowners' estates, as well as the business activity of the nobility was restrained by many circumstances. For a considerable part of gentry the conditions of the reform of 1861 conducting in fact turned to lead to the complete impoverishment: there was a reduction of the number of real estates in their private ownership, the lack of money became the major problem. Regarding the Penza province, the number

of land property owned by the nobility from 1861 to 1905 was reduced by a third. A considerable part of the property was put in pledge in private land banks [5, p. 19–20]. A so-called “depletion” of nobility, brilliantly depicted in Terpigorev’s essays, became a commonplace phenomenon [20].

In the sources there are numerous evidences that during the post-reform decades the landowners leased the land to peasants on terms of its full cultivation. In fact, such system (called “metayage”) did not differ from those of the times of serfdom, it was characterized by low efficiency, and both the landowners and representatives of scientific community also admitted this fact [4, p. 393–397; 21, p. 158].

The economic problems in combination with the preserved mind traditionalism determined the overall picture of the situation typical for the overwhelming majority of the nobility during the post-reform decades.

Under such circumstances the preservation of the way of life typical for noblemen before became extremely difficult or even impossible keep on.

A small part of the nobility accepted this new realia psychologically and ideologically and was engaged in the intensification of their estates or immersed into the entrepreneurship in cities. But for the majority of them such life strategies were unacceptable.

A desire to be free from the new invading and the old unsolved problems, the loss of life guidelines had the largest impact on the middle-aged and aged representatives of the nobility. The alcoholism and card gambling were common among the males. There were numerous cases of mental illnesses and suicides. Under such circumstances many women tried to put up with all the ordeals in life patiently and not wash the dirt linen in public. They became the heads of their families, were actively engaged in doing the house work instead of the “numerous servants” as they could not afford them anymore. The attitude of mind of this part of nobility was accurately expressed by St. Petersburg official’s wife O. G. Bazankur: “God, I wish I could have more money! I don’t even know what I’m ready to do in order to get it – anything, I’ve been starving and suffering for so long! If only I could live the whole month without counting every penny” [7. D. 3. L. 102 ob.].

Undoubtedly, there’s no need to have implicit faith in such “confessions”: not all the noblemen were absolutely impoverished, not all of them truly were “hard up for money”. But still the complaints (part of them is found only in diaries, the other part was sent to the different state agencies, even to the Emperor) weren’t groundless. The life of the nobility during the post-reform years really became more difficult, and what is more important, the noblemen’s ideas of “poverty”, “hardship”, “justice” etc. changed [23, p. 18–21].

Not only the older generation of the nobles, but also the young people had to get accustomed to a new post-reform reality. Their financial situation seemed to be the most complicated. The illustrative example of this is the mode of life of the Shestakovs', the family of students-spouses, who rented one cheap room and had their meals in the canteen (either in turns or shared one serving). Rarely they "cooked at home, the potatoes with herring mainly" [18, p. 105–106].

Young women from the nobility families had the biggest hardships in their lives. If the parents were able to find some financial resources for the education and training of their sons, helping them to make a career and expecting them to be their breadwinners in old age, the situation with daughters was much more complicated. In conditions of maximum economy they became a serious burden to their families, they had a hard time being dependents and searched for their own employment.

Under the influence of economic problems young noblewomen took a heightened interest of getting higher education, besides they were ready to compete with men on equal terms. In addition to that, their ideas of family and wedlock started to change tremendously. Of course, the marriages of a young noblewoman to a middle-aged man which were typical for that time, still existed. But such phenomena as creating a family without being officially married and even the refusals to create a family started to spread widely [24, p. 57–58].

The changes in public minds affected not only the economic categories, but also moral principles of the nobility. The end of the 1860s – 1870s was marked with a serious spike in the number of divorces of noblemen. Among the factors that caused this phenomenon, let us mention two of them: first of all, the crisis of family budgets (in this situation the wife didn't want to spend the money that she earned herself on her husband incapable of bringing the material wealth to the family and squandering the money); second of all, the increase in the number of divorces was influenced by the liberal ideas spreading in the society, according to these ideas the divorce was considered to be justified and even fair, if one of the spouses fell in love with someone else [22, p. 406–410].

A noticeable phenomenon of that time required the redistribution of family and social duties between a husband and a wife and the formation of new types of a family organization of the nobility – "new ideological" and "new practical" families. It was common not only for a husband, but even for a wife to take part in social and professional activities. In the first case, it happened primarily under the influence of the progressive ideas about sexual equality [8. D. 8–48], in the second case – as a result of economic changes in life of the nobility in the second half of the XIX – the beginning of the XX centuries [12. D. 2; 15. D. 61].

Thus, the process of modernization, that covered different spheres of Russian society in the second half of the XIX – the beginning of the XX century, had an effect on the nobility, caused serious changes in their lives. The following changes can be considered the main. First of all, it is the considerable aggravation of the financial situation that forced them to search for the new ways of adaptation to the altered conditions.

Secondly, it is a wide range of live strategies of the nobility – from the attempts to draw into a shell to an active participation in the management of commercial ventures. Thirdly, there was an actual breakdown of traditional family-matrimonial relations that was a reflection of profound changes in the public minds of the nobility during the post-reform period. Regarding this it's necessary to take a fresh look at the of Alexander II “Great reforms”, refusing to consider them to be “halved” or issued only for the benefits of the nobility. These reforms accelerated the processes of modernization in Russia, decisively influenced the changes in noblemen's everyday life, ruined their habitual lifestyle. This very circumstance (not the reforms by themselves) formed a frequently negative attitude to the processes of modernization, increased the level of social instability and became the source of new social disruptions.

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**The officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
in the second half of the 19th century: a personal story
and general characteristics**

**Служащие Министерства иностранных дел России
во второй половине XIX в.: личная история
и общие характеристики**

The article studies the formation of the MFA staff in Russia in the second half of the 19th century, explores the case of a merchant family member, D.I. Abrikosov, employment and analyzes the number of officers and general trends of HR policy of the MFA.

В статье изучается формирование личного состава МИД России во второй половине XIX в., рассматривается пример поступления на службу представителя купеческой семьи Д.И. Абрикосова. Проведен анализ численного состава служащих и общих тенденций кадровой политики руководства МИД.

Key words: Russia, diplomacy, officials, HR policy, nobles, bourgeoisie, middle class.

Ключевые слова: Россия, дипломатия, чиновничество, кадровая политика, дворянство, буржуазия, средний класс.

It is believed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tsarist Russia was one of the most privileged departments and employed only the representatives of the upper class. Though there really was such tendency and it wasn't easy to get hired by the MFA, in the end of the 19th century some talented people, not only aristocracy representatives, started working at the Ministry [14; 15].

The story of the Russian diplomat Dmitriy Abrikosov is an illustrative example of how people without a noble birth emerged among the employees of the Foreign Ministry. How did the member of a famous confectioners' dynasty get to one of the most privileged state institutions of Russia in the second half of the 19th century, why did he choose the diplomatic career, and was the MFA of prerevolutionary Russia ready for such changes?

Dmitriy Ivanovich Abrikosov was born on the 11th of April, 1876, in Moscow, in one of the richest merchant families of Russia. The

Abrikosovs' confectionary manufacture, one of the first in Russia, was a small shop of a serf at the beginning and turned into to a famous chocolate empire throughout Russia finally¹. However, despite wide popularity and fame in pre-revolutionary Russia, the Abrikosovs were a mere merchant family. The Abrikosovs were professionals in their field and were successful and talented entrepreneurs, but, nevertheless, they didn't have any relation to the aristocrats, which were usually hired as diplomats by the the MFA. D.I. Abrikosov himself admitted that in the world of Russian aristocracy he was a "stranger" [1, p. 9–10], and, moreover, he was "considerably embarrassed by the fact that his colleagues associated his last name with caramel and candies, so he would rather have a more common last name" [9, p. 158].

Ironically, Dmitriy Abrikosov's life was far from «sweet». At the age of 5 Dmitriy lost both of his parents and was fostered by his uncle – Nikolay Alekseevich Abrikosov, who, actually, was like a father for him. His uncle was strange to confectionary manufacture and wasn't interested in it, but he used to attend the lectures at the Sorbonne and the Moscow State University in due time and so he was rather educated person. The circle of his contacts was relevant. It included people like, for example, A.F. Koni, a famous lawyer, and other well-known people of the second half of the 19th century.

After finishing the course in a public school, D.I. Abrikosov entered the Faculty of Sciences of Moscow State University. Before the beginning of the first academic year he went on a journey to England with his brother in 1894. P. E. Podalko, one of Abrikosov's biographers, believes that it was that time when "his love for England originated so that throughout his life Abrikosov seemed like a real England fan" [9, p. 141]. During this trip he developed the first interest to the diplomacy.

On the Faculty of Science Dmitriy Abrikosov didn't find his place and soon decided to change the faculty and to start studying the science of law. At the same time annual trips to Europe after exams turned into the kind of tradition for him. While studying at university, D.I. Abrikosov visited almost all European countries, as well as Turkey, Palestine and The North Africa. It couldn't but influenced the formation of his interests and development of his erudition and enlightenment.

D.I. Abrikosov got the first acquaintance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his fourth year at University. He needed to study some documents which were kept in the Archive of the MFA in Moscow to write

¹ The founder of the future empire was the serf Stepan, who paid the quit rent (obrok) to his landowner and was set free to a town, where he opened his first little shop with sweets. Such well-known candies as "Gusinie lapki" and "Rakovaya sheika" were created in the Abrikosovs' factory. Also the Abrikosovs' factory was the first to produce fruit jellies and pastila. The factory, founded by the Abrikosovs dynasty, still exists now under the name "Babaevskaya" [9; 19; 20].

a composition about Spinoza`s legal treatises. There he met a number of the researchers and officials of the Archive and established friendly relations with some of them. One of the Abrikosov`s friends, who believed that the road to the Ministry was closed for Dmitriy Ivanovich as he came from a merchant family, advised him to try to apply for a position in the Archive of the MFA to become a diplomat afterwards. By the end of the 19th century the most of the employees of the Ministry supposed that that diplomacy in Russia was no longer an exclusive prerogative of the aristocrats by birth.

After the graduation from the University, according to the Law on Military Service, Dmitiy Abrikosov joined the army, the artillery brigade located not far from Moscow, for a year. After finishing the military service, he got a job in the Moscow Archive of the MFA as a stepping stone for the further promotion a fortiori that that the Archive was headed by Duke P.A. Golitsyn, a friend of Abrikosov [1, p. 114–115].

Then on his way to the diplomacy career he passed an exam and moved to Saint Petersburg in order to work in the Ministry, in the Second (Asian) Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. In his memories Dmitriy Ivanovich gave vivid description of some details of the exam procedure which he called a “comedy” intended “not to make certain that a person had special knowledge, but to evaluate general behavior, appearance and mental speed” [1, p. 116]. D.I. Abrikosov managed to impress the examination board, headed by the deputy minister, who had been impressed by the Abrikosov`s aunt`s manor in The Crimea. This represented financial prosperity and stability of the candidate`s family. This factor contributed to his success, and Dmitrii Abrikosov was hired by the MFA. Abrikosov moved to Saint Petersburg, and when he had to decide where to live, he settled down at an English priest`s place. He made such a choice on a number of reasons: he didn`t have any friends in the capital; it was boring to live on his own; if he rented a hotel room, he would have to live the high life, which he tried to avoid. Thus, passed the exam and moved to Saint Petersburg, D.I. Abrikosov started working at the Ministry.

Later, when the ambassador in Great Britain, Duke A.K. Benkendorf, needed an assistant, the administration chose D.I. Abrikosov not only because he was a responsible and assiduous employee, but also because he was financially secured enough, as long as the most of the newcomers were either one thing or another. This assignment shows that Ministry was open not only for nobles, but for talented people with not so high social standing as well. In the example above the combination of good education and intellect with financial well-being did the trick, demonstrating the flexibility of the MFA HR policy together with preserving its basic principles.

The initial stage of work didn't impress Dmitriy Ivanovich much. «It didn't look like a brilliant life and there were no diplomatic secrets, which I imagined», mentioned Dmitriy Abrikosov in his memories. His words show discrepancy between the traditional image of work in the MFA as in a privileged Ministry, consisted of the members of the upper class only, and the reality. However, Abrikosov's promotion was quite fast comparing to his colleagues, who waited for this for years.

Abrikosov's diplomatic career itself started in London. Then, in 1911, he was appointed a second embassy secretary in Beijing and held this rank till 1912. In the period of the First World War, he was an officer of the Far East Department of the MFA, but soon he was invited to Tokyo by a new ambassador Vasiliy Nikolaevich Krupenskiy, his former coworker in China. When V.N. Krupenskiy left Japan, Abrikosov took his position. This was the peak of his diplomatic career. When the Soviet government was formed, D.I. Abrikosov stayed in Japan as a private citizen and spent more than 20 years as an emigrant (1925–1946). The life of Dmitriy Ivanovich and his work as a diplomat is studied by P.E. Podalko, M.U. Sorokina and other researchers [9; 16; 17; 18].

The story of Dmitriy Abrikosov is one of the 395 personal stories of the MFA officers of the second half of the 19th century. This number – 395 people – is the result of the investigation of “Annuals of the MFA” [2; 4; 5] and a formation of the list of the officials, who have been working in the Ministry from 1868 (new staff of the MFA) [10; 11] to the beginning of the 20th century. For the in-focus period, the Ministry has never exceeded the limits of the number of employees, though the significant rise of the number of employees in the central departments can be traced starting from the early 1890s. Such changes can be explained by several reasons. First, such processes as sophistication of the regulation system of foreign affairs all in all, steady expansion of Russian contacts with different countries and, consequently, expansion of the MFA and its employees functions were of great importance. The second reason is based on the first one: the amount of received and processed information in the Ministry permanently increased and thus required more and more officials. The words of Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov, one of the officers of the MFA, are an interesting confirmation of this fact. He described the situation in the MFA and the lack of employees in a letter to his friend: «... the work in the Ministry has is replete over the last days, but the there is few people» [13. D. 506]. At the same time the social base, from which people were hired to the MFA, started expanding. Thus, the possibility to become officials and diplomats of the MFA for not only nobles but for middle class as well is evident.

15,5% of the all Ministry officers were members of aristocracy: his highness the duke, 13 earls, 21 dukes and 27 barons. So, 62 out of 395 officers belonged to the Russian nobility. The privileged status of the

MFA can be confirmed by the number of officers who reached the high rank of civil service. For the in-focus period in the central departments of the MFA accounted: 1 chancellor (1st class), 6 actual privy councilors (2nd class), 29 privy councilors and 55 actual state councilors (4th class). As soon as getting the rank of an actual state councilor meant the acquisition of hereditary nobility, there were at least 91 people (or 23% of all employees of the MFA) of hereditary nobles. 103 people were promoted to the ranks of 5–9 classes, which gave personal nobility. Thus, such employment seemed to be tempting. However, these figures don't show the whole picture as social classes were not recorded in the Annuals of the MFA, which were the main source when studying the stuff of the MFA. That's why it is possible to find out the non-nobiliary origin of the officers only from such private stories like Dmitriy Abrikosov's one. Most employed people initially belonged to the nobles but, nevertheless, a 100% aristocracy staff has never existed.

If we turn to the beginning of the career of the MFA officials, it is important to understand that about 40% of them started as supernumerary unpaid workers. Such situation shows the importance of not only blood but stable financial position as well, as it was the family who had to aliment their child, hired for a supernumerary unpaid job, which sometimes required financial investments. By the end of the 19th century middle class members were the ones who frequently met these demands.

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**Aspects of the everyday life of the diplomatic corps in Russia
in the second half of the XIX – at the beginning of the XX centuries**

**Аспекты повседневной жизни иностранного дипломатического
корпуса в России во второй половине XIX – начале XX в.**

The paper explores the influence of the condition of foreign diplomatic service on everyday life of foreign diplomats in Russia in the second half of the XIX – at the beginning of the XX centuries. It is shown that profession of a diplomat determinates idle, gossipy way of life, makes it a necessary part of the diplomat's profession.

В статье рассматривается влияние условий заграничной дипломатической службы на повседневную жизнь иностранных дипломатов в России во второй половине XIX – начале XX в. Показано, что профессия дипломата предопределяла светский образ жизни дипломата, делая его необходимой составляющей профессии дипломата.

Key words: diplomats, everyday life, the diplomatic corps, diplomacy, everyday life history, foreign policy.

Ключевые слова: дипломаты, повседневная жизнь, дипломатический корпус, дипломатия, история повседневности, внешняя политика.

Despite general importance, issues of the everyday life and daily practice of social and professional groups, in particular – the diplomatic corps, stay understudied in modern historiography. Solely some aspects of diplomat's abnormal everyday life during wartime are already studied [5]. Only official and public side of diplomat's activity is known in historical studies, while aspects of the everyday life stay in the background. As a proxy between the sending state and the host country, the diplomat has a direct impact on the development of relations between countries. Under the influence of his subjective perception and personality traits was determined the kind of the reports drawn up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formed the analytical and evaluative judgments on key issues of international policy. In light of this, the study of aspects of the everyday life of diplomats, ordinary embassy employees as well as heads of mission, is very significant.

First of all, it should be noted that the foreign diplomatic service determinates flexible working hours, which made it possible for diplomats to spend the remaining time in its sole discretion. Usually diplomat's informal discussions were held in the framework of the sport and entertainment of Saint Petersburg.

The most popular sport clubs were «Imperial St.Petersburg yacht-club», «Murino-golf» and «Krestovsky Lawn Tennis». Imperial

St.Petersburg yacht-club – one of the most famous and elite yacht-club in Russia, was very popular among diplomats [1, p. 1–38; 2, p. 1–47; 3, p. 1–44]. The number of its full-fledged members was limited by 125 people [18, p. 5; 19, p. 55; 20, p. 6]. Ambassadorship, designating the high status of its owner, made it possible for diplomats to enjoy a number of privileges for admission to the club. According to the Club's regulations, chief of a mission (ambassador, envoy and head of mission) taken without ballot [17, p. 10, 12–13; 18, p. 58; 19, p. 58; 20, p. 8–9]. This rule does not apply both to the acting chief of the mission (charge d'affaires) and ordinary embassy's staff: they could become members of the club only through the ballot [18, p. 59]. For getting club access they had to provide the Committee with a written recommendation of its ambassador, envoy and chief of a mission [19, p. 64; 20, p. 14]. Chief of a mission, as a rule, provided patronage to their staff, which greatly simplifies the admission for a young diplomat to the club members [9. D. 269. L. 1]. Privacy and exclusivity of the club, close friendly relations among its members, made its membership honorary and prestigious among members of the diplomatic corps.

«Krestovsky Lawn Tennis» was the most numerous tennis club in the country, while "Murino Golf" club at different times consisted of 16 to 29 people. It included members of the British and American embassies, their families, members of the English colony [22. D. 1. L. 1–29]. The only representative of the Russian side was the Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich - the honorary chairman of the club since its foundation.

«St.Petersburg English society» was popular among foreign diplomats too - one of the largest social clubs of the capital: its membership for over 50 years ranged from 350 to 450 people [13, p. 1–60; 14, p. 1–46]. Only in 1915, in wartime, the number of its members was only 139 [15, p. 1–58]. According to the Club's regulations chief offices get free admission [4, p. 83]. Foreign diplomats were actively enjoying preferential membership and visited the club [13, p. 1–60; 14, p. 1–46; 15, p. 1–58; 4, p. 83], which gave them the opportunity to meet with representatives of political and public circles of Russia in an informal setting.

At the same time, compulsory publicity of a diplomat's life causing the desire for private and privacy where is possible. This was reflected in the formation of clubs and social organizations, consisting mostly of diplomats, generally – representing one country. Thus, in contrast to the «russified» «St.Petersburg English society» «New English club» was opened, created for «the convenience British colony in St.Petersburg» [21, p. 1]. Members of the club were subjects only of Great Britain and the United States, businessmen, staff members of the British Embassy [4, p. 102]. Club members organized different sports activities and games, performed charity events and organized dinner parties and banquets on the occasion of national holidays and the arrival of England officials, delegations and public figures [22. D. 14. L. 1–12; D. 5. L. 1–8; D. 3. L. 1–15].

Many diplomats have been regular visitors to the noble salons of Countess Kleinmichel, the general's wife Bogdanovich, Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna and others [12. D. 237. L. 11 ob., 51 ob.; D. 235. L. 68 ob., 126; 6, p. 183; 7, p. 68; 16, p. 262, 265]. Their mistresses were women who had not only extensive contacts in the public and court circles, but also a great influence on the formation of a secular public opinion [11, p. 5–7, 10–11]. The popularity of these fine ladies attracted in their salons people of different social status and political orientation. For foreign diplomats this meant the opportunity of an acquaintance with the Russian public representatives, communication with whom would be impossible in a different situation because of their official status and other difficulties.

Due to frequent changes of residence and visits to various countries, many diplomats collected works of art, antiques, numismatics in their free time [8. D. 99. L. 1–2; 10. D. 34. L. 6–7]. This was encouraged by the privileges of a diplomatic service: diplomatic baggage wasn't inspected at the borders and exempted from duties. Many diplomats were found of hunting and fishing. Numerically insignificant hunting clubs were consisted of representatives of the Russian elite and the highest court officials [23, p. 73–76; 24, p. 170, 173, 175].

As a result, everyday life of the diplomats, as lobbyists and representatives of the interests of foreign powers, was subordinated to the reasons of the service. If the protocol meetings and official visits were official duties and were more a manifestation of politeness, then the informal visits, participation in entertainment activities, communication within the elite clubs and societies, whose composition regardless of the specificity was identical, served as a means to enhance communication and trust with representatives of the elite, aristocratic, court and government circles.

That communication in backstage, court circles, behind-the-scenes conversations between government officials and diplomats allowed to access the information of a personal property, which is invaluable in the diplomatic sphere. As intermediary power between the sending country and the host country, diplomats used the possibility of formation of information channels and channels of influence through informal visits and social events, which allowed not only to predict the reaction of the public opinion on different events, but also have a significant impact on its formation. Accordingly, the diplomatic profession is not only justified idle, gossipy way of life, but also makes it a necessary part of the diplomatic service.

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**The evolution of legislative regulation of child labor
in the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th
and first half of the 20th centuries**

**Эволюция законодательной регламентации детского труда
в Российской империи во второй половине XIX – начале XX в.**

The article describes the evolution of the legislation on the employment of minors in the second half of XIX – early XX centuries is Shown as the formation of capitalist relations, the intensification of the labor movement, in combination with periodic concessions on the part of manufacturers with successive government response, influenced the change of factory laws. They touched on the limitations of age, working time and occupational safety and health, at the same time improved working conditions, increased wages.

В статье рассмотрена эволюция законодательства о труде несовершеннолетних во второй половине XIX – начале XX вв. Показано как формирование буржуазных отношений, активизация рабочего движения, в сочетании с периодическими уступками со стороны фабрикантов чередовавшимися с правительственной реакцией, повлияли на изменение фабричных законов. Они коснулись ограничения возраста, времени работы и охраны труда, одновременно улучшились условия трудовой деятельности, повысилась заработная плата.

Key words: children, child labour, young workers, factory laws, students craft workshops.

Ключевые слова: дети, детский труд, малолетние рабочие, фабричные законы, ученики ремесленных мастерских.

There was no general industrial legislation in the Russian Empire in the middle of the 19th century. This fact greatly inhibited the development of industrial and handicraft production. Nevertheless the formation of bourgeois relations, the labor movement stirring up in conjunction with the periodic concessions from manufacturers alternating with Government's reaction have affected the evolution of the industrial legislation in the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries.

Industrial laws of the Russian Empire distinguished three groups of minors: 1. Children under 12 – were forbidden to recruit;

2. Juveniles at the age of 12 to 15 years – most of regulations on labor protection (prohibition of night work, limitation of working hours, etc.) applied to this group;

3. Teenagers at the age of 15 to 17 years – whose labor was protected significantly less than the labor of children and juveniles. As soon as the worker had achieved the age of 17, he considered to be an adult [1, p. 7].

The entrepreneurs of Saint-Petersburg point of view for the use of child and teenagers labor differed from those of industry representatives from other regions of Russia and first of all the Central district, which determined the development of disputes relating to the restrictive legislation on juveniles.

The first congress of manufacturers was held in the 1870th in Saint-Petersburg. During this congress the debate about the work and school education of the juvenile worker was started. It revealed two different points of view for the child labor that showed an increasing competition between St. Petersburg and Moscow-Vladimir region. The congress adopted a resolution aimed to limit the labor of minors:” so that limiting the number of working hours for adults and minors and admission of recent to work in the new charter of the factory and the factory industry has been agreed with the guidelines drawn up recently on the subject in other states” [6, p. 306].

Industry representatives from Central Russia told that a lot of enterprises would have to stop all their activity if the government produced the regulations restricting work of minors. “The question is, what will the families do, if children don’t work under 17 years? ... It is clear what they will do: those families, who don’t work in a factory, indulge in drinking or go begging. I don’t see any reason not to admit them to work – usually they work from 6 am till 12 pm so they do not work for more than 12 hours per day” [2, p. 72].

The first factory legislation was the Highest approved opinion of the State Council of the 1st June, 1882 “About minors working in the factories and manufactories” initiated by the Minister of Finance N. Bunge. The law claimed: “To establish the following rules relatively to minors:

1. Children under 12 years old are not permitted to work.

2. Juveniles at the age of 12 to 15 years are prohibited to work more than 8 hours per day not including the time needed for breakfast, lunch, dinner, schools and leisure. Moreover the work shouldn’t continue more than 4 hours in a row.

3. Juveniles under 15 years are prohibited to work between 9 pm and 5 am, as well as on Sundays and highly solemn days.

4. Juveniles under 15 years are prohibited to admit to production or/and works that are harmful to their health, or should be considered a debilitating for them. The list of such factories, manufactories, and

definition of age (under 15 years old) under which the work of juveniles in mentioned enterprises is not allowed, to be determined by mutual agreement of the Ministers of Finance and Internal Affairs.

5. The owners of the fabrics, factories and manufactories are required to provide working children the opportunity to attend educational institutions. For education should be spared 3 hours per day or 18 hours per week. Such possibility is provided for children who don't have certificate completion of zemstvo's school or some other school of equal status [7. D. 5013. L. 3].

The law was put in force starting from the May 1883 but didn't apply for all craft institutions and didn't stop the practice of the work of children under 12 years, as well as children work at nights in all branches of industry labor. This gradual law practice was proof that the government was far from thinking to cause substantial or unexpected damage for industry.

Special inspection under the Ministry of Finance to the Department of Commerce and Manufactures was set up to control the execution of work and education of working children decrees. Inspectors were to: "1. monitor the implementation of regulations about attending classes and zemstvo schools by working children. 2. arrange reports about violation of the decrees with the participation of the local police and transfer these protocols to the pertaining judicial establishments. 3. accuse the perpetrators of offenses in court" [7. D. 5013. L. 3–3 ob.]. The first chief inspector of factory inspection was E. Andreev.

As for handicraft enterprises, the attempt to apply the law of June 1, 1882 to them has failed. The project remained unrealized, and the children started studying mainly at an age which was dictated by their parents' income and production conditions. Handicraftsmen concealed age of children working on them and objected to the legislative regulation in respect of working children. All-Russian Congress of handicraftsmen in Nizhny Novgorod in 1896 rejected a proposal to improve living conditions of handicraft students. The Congress has passed a resolution not to set up the age limit of admission to the craft production.

The first factory inspectors had to endure a tough struggle against the owners. Even in the St. Petersburg, one of the most progressive regions, they faced the industrialists who tried to prevent inspections of their manufactures pretending that they did not have such a young workers. They harshly expressed their protest and even threatened complaint to the Ministry of Finance. However, during the inspection the juveniles were found hidden in attics, latrines and other places with the privity of the factory administration.

The materials of factory inspection represent the decreasing level of child labor at the factories. In general it was true. The laws restricting the employment of children, were observed anyhow. But that did not mean

that practically the law was not avoided somehow and that children did not actually work more than they did according to these witness reports of the inspectors. The monitoring compliance with the law still remained weak, impunity encouraged contempt for the law.

In April, 1884 the State Council adopted a resolution, according to which: “1. owners and stewards of factories and manufactories responsible for the violations of rules, regarding work of minors in these institutions, are arrested for a period not exceeding one month or a monetary penalty not exceeding one hundred rubles; 2. in case of not providing minors to attend school for a set time, a penalty of not more than one hundred rubles” [2, p. 96]. However manufacturers were not afraid of penalties.

In June, 1884 a law on the school education of children was passed. The law of 1882, admitted 6 hours of continuous work of children instead of 8-hour (for four hours with a break), was amended. The law “On the prohibition of night work of minors and women in factories and manufactories” appeared in June, 1885. According to this, night work on cotton, linen and woolen fabrics was forbidden for teenagers under 17 years old. In October, 1885, the Minister of Finance has got the opportunity to distribute law’s effect on other sectors.

Legislative acts regarding working children were an indicator of the relation of forces of separate class groups as a whole in the country, and in St. Petersburg in particular. Entrepreneurs forced to cut working hours for children and juveniles, immediately held a proportional reduction in their salaries. Those juveniles whose working hours were reduced by one-third (from 12 to 8 hours), after reduction earned three times less than before it [4, p. 86].

After the publication of the Law of 3rd of June, 1885, commission headed by V. Plehve has drafted the project of regulations “On the employment of workers at factories and manufactories” and “Special rules on Mutual Relations between manufacturers and workers”, which were approved in June 3, 1886. This was done under the pressure and at the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These regulations have drastically changed the conditions of employment of the workers, and therefore juveniles, which existed before.

The law of 24th of April, 1890, appeared in a very competitive environment between the manufacturers from St. Petersburg and central region. This law has suspended development of the labor legislation and has significantly expanded the rights of entrepreneurs to exploit juveniles.

According to the decree of October 4, 1888, all previously issued temporary regulations on work of children and juveniles had effect only until January 1, 1890. By this time, the authorities assumed to establish the final content of restrictive labor laws for juveniles basing on the

materials about the consequences of all actions previously taken in this field.

In 1890, the Minister of Finance I. Vyshnegradsky introduced a bill that weakened the value of the laws of the 1880s. After this, working children could be involved in working process during 9 hours in two shifts for 4,5 hours.

In the XIX–XX centuries the laws about children's labor, and in particular in relation to the duration of their working day, while implementing, used to take ugly forms alien to the interests of the workers. Manufacturers of St. Petersburg, due to competition, demanded restrictive rules without worsening the working conditions for juvenile, since it was not profitable. On the other hand, the industrialists of the Central region, for which an underage labor laws were of a threatening nature, tried to reduce the value of these laws to a minimum. As it couldn't be done legally, they used to hide underage workers and transfer them to the next age group or just ignored the law and increased the number of working hours [3, p. 136].

Under the influence of the events of 1905 the government began to hastily develop laws on the labor question, hoping to delay the revolutionary movement. But the industrial bourgeoisie, demanded political concessions from the government, did not agree to give up at least part of their rights and opportunities, and therefore did not support the government in its endeavors, that is why the projects of 1905–1907 were not approved and were forgotten later.

The government at the turn of XIX–XX centuries had to balance between the interests of manufacturers and a growing labor movement. It tried to cause the least inconvenience to industrialists giving the impression of the progressive movement of the legislation in respect of protection of child labor... At the beginning of the XX century technological innovations greatly affected the equipment on factories and manufacturers. If before mechanization helped manufactories to get rid of using 'muscular force' and to employ juveniles instead, then after the invention of high-technology machines, the production required trained and technically conscious worker to do work [2, p. 120]. Due to these changes, underage workers were gradually supplanted by women and juveniles aged 14–17 years.

An emergency meeting was convened in February 1907. During this meeting manufacturers again made an effort to change the age criteria of children and juveniles and the limitation of working hours. Special attention was payed to the question of the night-time work. According to the law of 1882 a night – time work was defined as an interval between 9 pm and 5 am. The project of the Ministry proposed to assign night-time as time between 10 pm and 4 am. Thus, this proposal was a step backward compared with the existed norms. As a result of discussions,

night time was assigned as a continuous six-hour interval between 10 pm and 6 am.

Later the questions concerning the limitation of working hours of minors and juveniles were no longer discussed. Due to the recovery of the industry after 1910, the situation of children and juveniles had significantly improved. Increasing number of factories caused larger involvement of minors and juveniles in working process with an increase in wages and thus reduce unemployment among them. The working hours for minors in 1913 for 64,7% was more than 9 hours, for 27,9% was 9 hours and only 7,4% worked 8–8,5 hours [5, p. 40].

In the second half of XIX – early XX centuries the legislation related to child labor has got the most prominent changes for all time of its existence. It was a result of the labor movement and the revival of the industry. These changes affected primarily age limits, working hours limits and labor protection. At the same time it caused the improvement of working conditions, increase of wages and as a consequence the reduce of unemployment among minors.

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The problems of the childhood in the Ural provinces medicine of the post-reform period

Проблемы детства в медицине уральских губерний в пореформенный период

Children are an important part of the family. By the beginning of the 20th century both the working and the growing up population had been served by public medicine. This research is based on the documents of zemstvos and the governors' reports.

Дети являются важной частью социального института семьи. К началу XX в. на Урале дети обслуживались общественной медициной. Настоящее исследование основано на документах губернских земств и отчетов губернаторов.

Key words: Infant mortality, morbidity, history of the healthcare, Perm, Orenburg, Vyatka provinces.

Ключевые слова: детская смертность, заболеваемость, история здравоохранения, Пермская, Оренбургская, Вятская губернии.

The population of mining and melting areas of the Ural turned to the help of maternity nurses but the peasants ignored them [11. L. 116]. A maternity nurs had 15–20 parturitions annually, midwives served 5% of the population. Therefore 17% of the babies at the age of one month died [10, p. 225; 13, p. 71].

The problem of the relationship between the maternity nurses and the widwives was constantly there. Obstetrical courses were opened in Vyatskaya and Permskaya provinces. Only in 1915 the situation in countryside has improved due to the extending of medical service.

At the same time there were paramedic schools and maternity wards opened at the hospitals. But women turned to the official medicine service only in difficult cases. Maternity wards have become popular with the railways development [9, p. 134]. From the beginning of the 20th century maternity and specialized wards started their work in uyezds.

The health of a child in his first year of life depended on the residence and religion of his family. Too young mothers couldn't have healthy babies [10, p. 220]. This was especially typical of Muslim families.

Some rites of peasants were dangerous for life. For example in Vyatskaya province the baby had his head given a “beautiful” shape by a midwife. That increased the number of insane people [7, p. 103].

For the first days mother and baby lived in banya (bathhouse). Mothers ate only bread and kvass and babies were given ritual bread [12, p. 14]. After the third fast, mothers gave up feeding babies with their milk. Then during the fast children were given a red wine as tonic [10, p. 220, 215]. The ration of a peasant child consisted radish with sour kvass, herring, potatoes, cabbage soup [1, p. 69]. Wrong feeding led to the scrofula, consumption, etc. Another reason of the child mortality was living in the insanitary conditions of the country houses.

The main factor of the child’s life protection was vaccination (smallpox), the coverage of such vaccination reached 75% in mining and melting areas. As for the peasants, they opposed: they washed off vaccination, bribed those who vaccinated them, asked for fake registers. This led to the fact that 40 % of vaccinations required re-vaccinations, Permskaya province's authorities considered that smallpox vaccination of the whole province was impossible, so they refused to do it at once.

The second half of the 19th century was characterized with such family disease as primary and inherited syphilis, the rate of syphilis infection among the children reached 70%. They were infected with syphilis through the nipples, foster mothers, maids and so on [8, p. 132]. Children with inborn syphilis might infect the whole family [2. L. 58]. While the population of mining areas was quite healthy (because they were examined regularly and used hospitals service), the situation in ethnic and peasant areas was far worse. At the beginning of the 20th century the outpatient treatment of syphilis gave way to the hospital medical care, regarding children as well.

The problem typical of The Urals was goiter. The disease rooted in the childhood often led to the cretinism in the adulthood [4, p. 22].

First medical (ophthalmic) aid groups frequently faced the trachoma infection in uyezds; seven years old children (about 18%) needed the surgical operation, many teenagers were already blind. The reasons of this disease were divided by nationality. The Udmurts lost sight because of high headdress, the Kirghises – due to the dust, the Russians – by the reason of injuries they got during the working process [14, p. 75].

Zemstva faced the epidemics of childhood diseases: diphtheria, measles scarlet fever. In Vyatskaya province they developed some measures of fighting these diseases in peasant environment: the isolation, the revaccination, the destruction of the infected things, closing of schools. Permskaya province focused on the sera production and founded a bacteriological station in 1895 [15, p. 76].

The doctors of zemstvo could control children’s health only at schools and had some influence on the family hygienic through the

pupils. The pupils were provided with free medicines, their health was monitored, but actually there were no regular school doctors in the Urals.

Children in hospitals accounted for 10% of all the patients. Peasants did not bring small children to hospitals – they were afraid of the infection with other diseases. In Orenburg province only the children from the orphanages were served by the public hospitals. The authorities of Perm refused to open a children department afraid of increasing the death rate.

Mortality rate among babies in Ural provinces exceeded that in Europe many times. In Permskaya and Vyatskaya provinces it was 60%, in Orenburg province – 70% (Kirghis population excluded). The death rate among children depended on the season of year and the welfare of a family. Children in Udmurt and Islamic families died for religious reasons more than for any other reasons.

The Association "Day nurseries" appeared in Russia in 1893, intended for the children of workers, but it was funded by the state [12. L. 13–14]. In a year after the opening of "Society for struggle against children's death in Russia" (1908) its departments appeared in Permskaya and Vyatskaya provinces; as for Orenburg province, this kind of work was most important there. The Association of the physical development of children also functioned in that region, it widely included doctors and teachers [3. L. 2–3].

Day nurseries were the first institution of the children protection. In Permskaya and Vyatskaya provinces they combined the state and the charitable funding, but the amounts were small.

In Orenburg province day nurseries depended on the personal initiative of the doctor M.M. Kenigsberg who introduced new approaches of work with children: nurseries, orphanages for the starving, sanatoria. Nurseries adopted weakened children up to 7 years. They laid stress on balanced nutrition of the children. At the same time they struggled against reprocessing of milk into butter, because there was not enough of a whole milk for peasant children [5, p. 92–94].

In 1907 there was a department of the society "Milk Drop" established in Orenburg. During the very first year the nurseries lowered the death rate of the neighboring villages children by 16 times. In 1896 there were 6 nurseries founded in Orenburg province, in 1897–11, in 1898–12, in 1903–16.

There were some more kinds of the teenagers' health protection. By the beginning of the 20th century country houses kept by the Women's gymnasia, the Technical school, Bogoroditskaya parish school functioned in Permskaya province, near the Kama river. In 1895 the sanatorium for weakened teenagers was opened in the place Fileiskoe of Vyatskaya province. The summer sanatorium for weakened children from poor families worked for 10 years, beginning from the 1898th. Teenagers from Moscow and Tula came there, too.

Thus, questions of medicine and demography initiated special attention to the problems of childhood in the Urals provinces situated in the difficult climatic zone.

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Agricultural labor squads of Petrograd students in 1915

Сельскохозяйственные трудовые дружины учащихся Петрограда в 1915 г.

This article is about one of the public charitable initiatives of The First World War period – the organizing pupils labor squads in order to help peasant families of the reserve soldiers and militias. The article reveals the features of the formation and activity of labor squads of Petrograd educational institutions' students in 1915. It also analyzes the problems, which members of squads faced with in countryside, and how these problems influenced the fecundity of the work done.

Статья рассказывает об одной из общественных благотворительных инициатив в годы Первой мировой войны – организации трудовых дружин учащихся для помощи крестьянским семьям запасных и ратников. В статье раскрываются особенности формирования и деятельности трудовых дружин учащихся общеобразовательных учреждений Петрограда в 1915 г. Анализируются проблемы, с которыми столкнулись дружинники в деревне, их влияние на результативность выполненных работ.

Ключевые слова: Первая мировая война, трудовые дружины учащихся, благотворительность, сельскохозяйственные работы, Петроградская губерния.

Key words: The First World War, the labor squads of pupils, charity, agricultural work, Petrogradskaya province.

The First World War started in summer of 1914 had a profound impact on the Russian society. Along with causing negative and destructive consequences the war has invoked positive tendencies as well. The main of them was the willingness of various society stratum to help army and front, war victims. There was All-Russian Zemsky Union of Assistance to Sick and Wounded Soldiers established in August, 1914. The country was on a wave of patriotic demonstrations actively supported by studying youth. The volunteering of senior schoolkids has become a commonplace [14]. The fund-raising for the needs of war (“kruzhechnye sbory”) were held ubiquitously. They also were held in order to help families of those who was mobilized to the front, cripples, orphans, soldiers.

The First World War has given birth to the lots of public initiatives, including the initiative of help to the peasant families which have lost a wage-earner. This kind of help was implemented with the participation of

juveniles. In Autumn, 1914, General Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture initiated the establishment of students labor squads in the subordinated agricultural educational institutions (circular orders of 28th July, 2nd August and 9th October, 1914). Students of 79 agricultural schools from 48 provinces and regions overall were involved in charity work [22] (according to other sources, only in lower institutions 80 squads were organized, they worked in 51 provinces [10, p. 544]). At the same time there were separate guys eager to help the harvest [9, p. 4; 15].

In 1915 the movement of labor squads has covered public schools [7; 9]. The events that happened in Minsk province were general impulse to that. The movement of the labor squads in this region was strongly supported by its governor A. F. Girs. There were overall 312 people combined in 21 squads who worked in Minsk province in 1915 [24, p. 15]. The movement expanded also with the support of the Ministry of Education. On the 6th of June, 1915, it has issued a circular № 25716 which suggested the trustees of school districts to “contribute the organization of such squads in all ways” [19, p. 17 –18]. The participants of the movement were also inspired by the Emperor's gratitude which he expressed during the personal meet with the governor Girs on the 27th of June, 1915 [24, p. 30–31].

At the same time The Petrograd Parents' Association gave rise to the same movement in Petrograd. General meeting of the association held on 4th of April, 1915, included inter alia the question of summer vacation for children. The point was to organize their free time in such a way, that they “had an opportunity to benefit Homeland in the hard time of war, and were protected from runaway to the seat of war”. Members of the association concerned about the increasing number of such runaways, so they recognized the need to “explain to the youth that children's' help on the front is almost useless as long as the risk for them is high; at the same time here, in the regions that weren't touched by war they can provide peasants with a great help in agricultural works” [26, p. 45]. As a result some newspapers have published the proclamation announced the following: “Now come with your young energy to help your Homeland, take in your hands the shovel, scythe, sickle – whatever is on your forces – and alone or consolidating around the respected and experienced people (there are enough of sympathetic souls in Russia) get closer to soil and peasants and support the orphaned families.

And if this kind of work is not on your forces, take care of little peasants' children, organize nurseries in the countryside and thus you will let juveniles out of the need to nurse their brothers and sisters so they could help their mothers” [5; 11, p. 8].

This initiative was faced both with enthusiasm – by schoolers and students – and controversially – by adults. The “Kievskaya mysl” has published the skit making fun of the situation when father-middlebrow fits

out “his militant child Pet'ka”. Neither in the father's nor in the son's mind there was no idea of what profit can take a peasant from “townish Pet'ka”. The author doubted whether agricultural work (as well as any other routine work) could be attractive for the youngster, “when “the war” attracted him by the poetry, heroism, feats and fame” [25].

Metropolitan newspapers republished this skit, showing off their ironic attitude not to the idea of organizing labor squads itself, but to the ballyhoo raised by the conservative and “yellow” press around the idea that “gymnasium squads were represented as a panacea for solving the problem of the worker crisis in the countryside caused by the war” [28, p. 2]. The society and even some members of squads doubted that “non-specialists, without preliminary study, without technical skills, without predial background, could be useful there; there even were fears that students will more likely spoil something than really help...” [8, p. 6]. “The arrival of students to the countryside at the time of hard work itself may not cause big hindrances, but it exactly breaks the work intension which is so valuable for peasants in such time”, - wrote a correspondent from the newspaper “Shkola i zhizn” [6, p. 3].

First results of the labor squads' work showed that, provided enough with the organization and financial support, they were plenty perspective. Taking part in agricultural work and acquaintance with the countryside lifestyle were very significant for townee students; physical outdoor activity influenced well on the health of squads' members. The countryside has taken the monetary advantage of chargeless labor in a very short time. From the economic point of view the countryside exactly needed more workers than money [2, p. 99].

At first members of the squads faced the organization problems. There were no common rules for squads formation, no mechanisms of cooperation with the local authorities and peasants. Some provinces just dodged from taking part in the movement.

In the May of 1915 there was a Committee on Organizing the labor squads established in Petrograd. It related to the association «Narodnaya pomoshch'» and included 6 members of the Petrograd Parents' Association headed by the well-known teacher N. S. Kartsev and the specialist in the agricultural field A. N. Gipler [18]. On the 28th of May the Committee has started its work from producing the Regulation on labor squads, the squads in-house routine and the approximate estimate for their supply (the monthly cost for the supply of a 15-members squad was set to the 300 rubles [8, p. 14]).

The head of the squad should have been assigned by the Committee from the people with agricultural experience. He was responsible for the cooperation with the local authorities and the peasants. There was also an elder chosen by the members of the squad in order to help the head. He was responsible for the in-house routine

and the menage. The top-leading was held by the supervisor chosen from the members of the Committee. He was responsible for monitoring the conditions of living and work of the squad, transfer to the place of work, helping the members of the squads during first 1–2 days after arrival and then attending them at least 1 time a week [12, p. 90]. Each member of a squad had to have the identification document, the permission from the doctor and parents. In case of wishing to leave the squad the member needed to make written declaration to the Committee the week before leaving, explaining the reasons in there [4, p. 56].

The committee asked the General Directorate of Land Management and Agriculture and the Petrograd governor for the permission to organize squads, for appro and for financial support. The minister of Education has approved the initiative by issuing the circular mentioned above on the 6th of June, 1915. This document though ordered trustees of educational districts to search for the finances needed in local sources: in the related Zemstvo and charity funds [19, p. 18; 21, p. 438]. The Ministry of Railways has also refused to provide members of squads with free of charge railway transfer to the work place. Only in the end of July after the second appeal of the Committee the Ministry permitted to use a discount: the fourth class wagon tickets were valid for travel in the third class wagon. However there was few time to use this benefit [8, p. 13–14].

There were letters written to provinces, zemstva and local landlords in order to find out where the help of the labor squads is needed most of all. One of the Committee members, S. Lebedev, noted that they had received a single answer, it was from a landlady. She was ready to shelter the squad to get some help with her own farm and because “she was scared to live alone” [8, p. 12–13].

On the 13th of June, 1915, the trustee of the Petrograd educational district has issued the circular № 219 that proclaimed: “the duty of those who don't bear the severity and danger of the military service is to help the families of the Homeland defenders and to provide them with a subsistence” [8, p. 11]. Although the Committee was really supported only in the end of June: the governor of Petrograd gave it “the carte blanche”, which contained the information that all local authorities are welcome to assist labor squads organized by the Committee. This made possible to apply to the volost' patronage organizations, agricultural associations and cooperations with an offer of labor squads' help. This time the organizers have received 16 responses with an agreement [8, p. 13].

Obviously the strongest need for squads' help was concentrated in the remote villages “where is much more of penury and poverty” and “where is far less of charity benefits given by different county committees, county funds and patronages” [28, p. 4]. But due to the lack

of financial support, the high cost of a horseback transfer, the problems with deliver of supply in such villages and squads' supervising organizations, the Committee had to choose the villages located close to railway stations. The loss of time was another problem. Due to this, only a little more than a half of 100 pre-enrolled students [12, p. 91] were actually sent to the villages (the rest students have gone on vacation or have found another work).

The main data about the work of labor squads in Petrograd province in 1915 are known thru the members of the Committee: S.N. Petropavlovskaya, who has presented the report about this on the Petrograd Parents' Association meeting on the 19th of September [12], S. Lebedev, who has published the article in the magazine "Russkaya shkola" [8]. Lebedev not only inspected the work of two squads, but has carried through the survey among the members of the squads (36 responses received), and also has analyzed their diaries and reminiscences. The newspapers published articles about Petrograd squads as well [13; 17; 23; 28; 29].

The first squad has been working from the 5th of July to the 14th of August, 1915, in the village Tosno, Tsarskosel'skii county. It was consisted of 14 students of a private secondary school. The school paid the piper for supplying the squad, providing the tools needed, and also provided the squad with servant.

On the 7th of April the squad consisted of 8 students from different educational organizations has gone to the village Pargolovo, Petrogradskii county. Due to the multiple requests of the local authorities this squad was increased to 19 members. As a result, there was lack of both work and tools formed, so the members of the squad had to work day through the day. The overage of a free time and the relaxing atmosphere (Pargolovo is the place for out-of-town vacation) have led to the discipline decline and pranks. This caused disfavor and this squad has completed the work earlier than others, on the 27th of July – as soon as the haying time has gone to an end. There is a remarkable fact about this squad: this was a single squad where each member paid for his supply by himself – 15 rubles per month [8, p. 14].

Only on the 15th of July the Soviet of the "Narodnaya pomoshch'" association decided to transfer 1000 rubles to the Committee. These money were intended for members' of the squads supply, thus four more squads were organized [8, p. 14]. Three of them worked in the Yamburgskii county, close to the stations of the Baltiiskaya railways (as it turned out, the peasants of this region needed help of the squads more than peasants of other regions). On the 19th of July 8 gymnasium pupils with their attendant arrived in the village Opol'e. On the 1st of August the squads started working in the villages Khotynitsy (10 people) and Syaglitsy (8 people). Both od them were mobile and permanently

traveled between the villages of this region. These squads included also 14 members of the Pargolovo squad. On the 14th–15th of August members of the squads returned back to the city.

The last squad has been working from the 9th to the 22nd of August in the village Ruch'i, Tsarskosel'skii county. It consisted the teacher and four guys and provided with help only one family: the peasant woman with six little children.

The most of members were 15–16 years old, only 4 people were 12–13 years old [8, p. 16]. There is no authentic data about social status of the squad members, but it is known that there were children of the officials and businessmen in one of the squads that was consisted of the students from one of the Petrograd gymnasiums [28, p. 11]. There was an intension to organize a female squad but there was not enough of enrolled girls. The Committee “couldn't provide girls with good enough conditions and did not want them to face too many difficulties” [12, p. 98].

Living conditions of the squads were not the same. Thus three squads have settled in the comfortable accommodations: the cottage of a wealthy farmer (Tosno), the building of a ministry school (Pargolovo) and the house of the agricultural association (Opol'e). They also had their own servant or hired local women for cooking or cleanup. The squad in the Ruch'i lived together with the woman whom they helped, they did all everyday routine by themselves. As for the two mobile squads that worked in the Yamburgskii county, they didn't have constant accommodation and often had to stay in the cottages that “were not adapted to living at all” and kept house by themselves. The members of the moloskovitskaya squad even cooked by themselves [12, p. 92–98].

Some aspects should be taken into account assessing the results of the labor squads activity. At first, the members of the squads had no background of the agricultural work. At best they were warned about possible difficulties to face. Some of the students even had no idea of what kind of a lifestyle they gonna face and how they will spend the time. “I thought that, – confessed one of the students, – that we would work for 2 hours, then we will go for a row or go picking flowers. But it turned to be the whole day of work!..” [28, p. 5]. However S. Lebedev pointed that after some days 8 of the fourteen students worked in Tosno have proved themselves as a good mower and worked alongside with peasants, the others teded the hay and helped to make stacks. The reports of the tosno squad elder point out: “39 tithes of the meadow have been mowed, the hay gathered from the 28 tithes has been dried, 7 stacks of hay have been maken, 91 wagons of hay have been transferred from the meadow to the farmsteads, 1 tith of bush has been cleaned up for mowing, 8 sazhen's of woods and 18 logs were prepared. Moreover members of the squad have cleaned up the brushwood in the forest and did some kinds

of a routine work” [8, p. 10]. In Pargolovo the squad has mowed the hay from the 32 tithes [12, p. 94; 13, p. 181].

In the questionnaires the squadmen marked that they've got their hand after a short time. As well as doing the works mentioned above, they also took part in a rye harvest and helped to fertilize the soil with manure. The duration of the working day was 8-12 hours, often despite the rain. One of the members of the squad noted in his diary: “Today is the holiday but we keep working, we are sick of holidays. It is harder to sleep all day long than to work all day long ...” [8, p. 21]. In Yamburgskii county and Pargolovo the teenagers used agricultural machines but often those machines were impossible to use or just useless.

Secondly, the productivity of work could be much higher if it was better organized by the local authorities. But the squads felt lack of help and support from zemstvas and local intellectuals. For example, in Pargolovo they even couldn't find the head of the volost' patronage. There was no unified directional center for distributing the workers on the provinces (let us remember that there were squads not only from schools but from agricultural educational institutions either). As a result, at first the work of squads was often used by wealthy peasants. Later the squadmen had to search for the destitute families by themselves and refuse to work on the fields of wealthy peasants. After such refuse they were ignored by the local authorities [12, p. 94]. There was a case when a soldier's wife used the help of two squads in different days: the local one and the one from Petrograd [28, p. 4]. Sometimes peasants even did not know about the arrival of a squad. The squadmen noted that the place of work often was far from their accommodation, so it took a lot of time to get there [8, p. 18]. They also complained of the lack of tools.

A curious situation happened with the squad sent to Tosno. The newspaper “Veчерnee vremya” received the letter from a peasant from Tosno. He complained of the fact that the squadmen worked for a wealthy peasant instead of helping really destitute families. On the 11th of July the newspaper published the article under the catchy headline “The abuse of youth labor” [29]. Later the head of the labor squads Committee revealed real situation in his letter. As the squadmen had no mowing experience, that wealthy peasant gave them not only an accommodation, but also an opportunity to get new skill while working on his farm (such practice existed in other provinces, and the owner could hardly get benefit from the incompetent work of the squadmen). The refutation was published in the “Veчерnee vremya” a week later [17].

Thirdly, peasants' attitude to the “city strangers” often changed very slowly. There was either distrust and consumer attitude (as long as a guy is here – he is to work for me). The members of the squads wrote: “the amaze, the disbelief and the gratitude have mixed up” [8, p. 18]. Furthermore the peasants supposed that squadmen “made a slip” and

did not believe that they take no advantage of their work. There even was the following opinion: “There is a colony for juvenile criminals in Petrograd and the gymnasiums are exactly those criminals, but they conceal this fact. They are to work for free because of it” [28, p. 9].

The members of the squads themselves were willing to do the larger scope of works than they were ordered to. They took up very hard or nasty, dirty work (to unlade heavy agricultural machines and spread manure). The members of the squads successfully coped with all the trials, that made the peasants respect them (at least those peasants, whom they helped). One of the squadmen wrote: “At first the peasants thought that those who arrived were “white-handed”, but they changed their point of view when they saw squadmen spreading manure. They could not believe, told that even among the peasants there was almost impossible to find the man who would agree to do it” [8, p. 23].

The members of the squads noted that heaven knows who got the most from this experiment, because the work in a squad has changed each of them: “the work has reeducated us and have found out the real labor, we've got the willingness to work”; “earlier we did not know that labor has an attractive power, now we languish without work” [8, p. 22–23]. Special attention was paid to “the beneficial effect, made by teachers' trust taking into account full freedom and independence”.

The great variety of labor squads types showed that northern provinces, as Petrogradskaya, need small-numbered squads (10–15 people), this could help to organize their work better. During the report of the squads' work results in 1915 the members of The Parents Association suggested to prepare future squads in advance. This could not only help to build a team, but also to give squadmen some agricultural background. The squads were supposed to work in countryside during the whole summer and in winter they were supposed to work in the city [27].

According to the estimations of the contemporaries, in the 1916th organization of labor squads in Russia turned into the global movement [8, p. 1; 20, p. 301]. There were 20 labor squads working in Petrogradskaya province, 15 of them worked on the farms, 3 – in the gardens, 2 (female) – organized nurseries and kindergartens in countryside [4, p. 60]; other sources tell us about 35 agricultural squads accounted 575 people and 13 squads that worked in the infirmary gardens of Petrograd [16, p. 6; 3, c. VII, 1–4]. The difference in numbers can be explained with not only absence of the official statistics but also with the fact that not all of the squads worked in Petrogradskaya province in 1916. Some of them were willing to help the peasants from chernozem and steppe regions because they needed help more than others; some moved to the neighbor provinces [1, p. 40, 46].

Estimating the organization of the work process in the squads, its management and preparing of the squadmen, contemporaries noted either pros and cons. The considered the educational component to be the most important point in this movement. That's why labor squads were likely to find support among the schools, the parents and the society. However in 1916-1917 the society focused on the financial component more because the efficiency of labor squads' activity was evident. There even was an idea to take fees from the peasants that used the help of the squads. Thus the educative and charity aspects of the squads' organization idea went to the wayside.

The short history of the labor squads in the period of The First World War approved their future potential but as “a journey to another social world” [28, p. 19]. The movement of the labor squads was filled with the deep ideological incentive motive of helping the wives of soldiers, widows and the families of disabled. Taking part in the work of a labor squad involved the youth in the collective defense of the Homeland.

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MILITARY HISTORY

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Rumors in Leningrad and Leningrad region in the period of the Soviet-Finnish War

Слухи в Ленинграде и Ленинградской области в период советско-финляндской войны

This article analyses the alternative information, which was distributed among the population of Leningrad and Leningrad region before and during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940 years.

В статье даётся анализ альтернативной информации, которая распространялась среди населения Ленинграда и Ленинградской области в преддверии и в ходе советско-финляндской войны 1939–1940 гг.

Key words: population, rumor , gossip, information, war.

Ключевые слова: население, слух, сплетня, информация, война.

In the last ten years national historical science keeps paying large attention to the problems of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940. A lot of researches give a thorough characteristic of the political and military part of this conflict [1; 2; 3; 13; 15]. However it should be noted that the authors of these researches analyze mainly the problems of combat readiness and military activity of the armies and fleets [5; 18; 19]. There is almost nobody who apply to the study of moral standards of soldiers or civil residents of the front-line areas. This article is an attempt to show the influence of rumors on the morale of Leningrad and Leningrad region citizens in 1939–1940.

The first rumors connected with the Soviet-Finnish relationships were noted some days before the military conflict. They were reasoned by the mistrust of considerable part of population to the official mass-media information. Against the background of growing aggressive and thought out Soviet propaganda against Finland, a lot of people were sure the war has already started. Thus, the worker of the bakery “Gari” in Leningrad region told her friends: “There are 2000 Soviet soldiers killed on the Estonian border and Finland has declared war on The USSR. The war is going on that's why our husbands do not come back”. In the same region the director of the company “Transtorgpit” Kantsel'son told his stuff: “We

have already had some fights against Finland, but there is nothing about it in the newspapers. I saw the train with wounded on the Moscow railway station, it has arrived from Petrozavodsk.” A worker of the kolkhos “Punyani-Tyakht” in Strugokrasnenskii region spread rumors that the war between The USSR and Estonia can't be avoided applying to the letters from her brother who lived in Estonia [17. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 107].

Those who spread such rumors often applied to the correspondence with their relatives who beared arms. Thus the worker of the meat processing plant in Pskov, Elkina, applied to her husband's letters: «Our Army is located on the Finnish border in bad conditions. The wounded are sent to Leningrad. The Red Army is exposed to raids of the Finns» [17. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 109]. It should be noticed that such rumors benefited to the official propaganda because they underlined the tensions of Soviet-Finnish relationships, convinced both civil and military parts of population that the conflict can't be avoided and should be resolved by military means. Finland was represented as an aggressive side both in rumors and in the propaganda.

New sources of rumors appeared with the beginning of military conflict. They were the Army and the Fleet, the opposing side and everybody who was involved into the military action.

The plot of the rumors was defined by the charcter of military action and that propagandistic idea which was chosen in order to influence each other. With the beginning of military action Finnish mass-media, as expected, started the global propagandistic war. Its aim was to create negative information background which was supposed to obstruct the work of political departments of The USSR and to benefit to the decline of the morale of civil and military people [17. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 125–126].

The opinion of the Finnish side penetrated to Leningrad through listening to Finnish radio broadcasts [10. Op. 6s. D. 849. L. 14] and through the contacts with the Finnish population of the Northwest, which from the very beginning opposed the policy of The USSR Government [17. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 107–109].

But the most actual and survivable rumors appeared in the army and fleet environment and were connected with taking part in the military activity. The chracter of those gossip can be described by the rumor which was widely spread both in the Army and Fleet and Leningrad. The rumor had it that Soviet airplanes bombed Soviet ships during the operation on taking the islands in the Gulf of Finland on the 30th of November, 1939. The reason for this rumor was the incident when the pilots of the 12th squadron did not make sure that there was an enemy under and opened fire on the island which was already taken by our Army. The pilot Chertkov opened fire on the group of Red Army soldiers [11. Op. 2. D. 68. L. 47] and the bomber SB of the 57th air regiment run

by the pilots Asadov and Maralin bombed by mistake our destroyer [14, p. 350]. These mistakes were caused by the problems of communication, but it did not interested those who spread rumors. The rumor about the planes bombed their own army kept on spreading and acquired more and more details. The last time this rumor was noticed on the 19th of January, 1940. The Red Navy Man Khlebnikov told his friends that a Soviet plane bombed his ship, then moved to the frontline and bomb land-forces until our aviation made it land [9. Op. 7c. D. 52c. L. 198].

All in all, in the first days of the war rumors and gossip did not influence Soviet people. Against the background of the successful attack people considered that they received enough of information from official sources.

The situation started to get worse in the beginning of December, 1939. As the Soviet attack was getting slower, the character of official information was changing. Instead of the large number of detailed messages there appeared the small number short ones. Finally to the 15th of January, 1940, the official information was just that there was nothing new on the front-line and the articles-refutations [7].

The affect of such articles was more negative because the considerable part of population interpreted them as “There is no smoke without fire”. Giving the description of that articles' influence on the morale of civil and military parts of the population we can apply to the letter of the second lieutenant M. V. Teterin to his wife from the 27th of December, 1939 [8, p. 195]. This letter shows that despite the combat losses, the Red Army men were still assured in the victory with the help of Soviet power. The author of the letter also believed Soviet mass-media. The fact that such tendency were widely spread among the soldiers can be proved also by the letter of the commander of a platoon Sergei Brovin to his colleague Mikhail Vilinov from the 28th of January, 1940. He wrote: “... The chances to survive here are low. But the fate may give me one. It is hard to fight with them... But I hope the victory will be ours...” [6]. In the same period of time a lot of Red Army men and commanders got critical about the official information. There was, for example, the report of the lieutenant Shpinev where he described the official information about taking the village Keviniemi by Soviet Army as a fraud and misleading, because the village was under the Finnish control when that information was published. The same source tells us that rumor had it that the Soviet Aviation had only three planes in order and only 5 trained pilots including Vodop'yanov “who, of course, won't be allowed here” [20, p. 153]. In conditions of lack of the detailed and objective information, the role and the significance of rumors grew up. Such rumors can be divided into several types.

The first one is the rumors from the front-line. Rumor had it that there were Finnish defenses of 5–7 floors height, that they were covered

with rubber or steel chain. The projectiles bounced off such defense and exploded nearby [16, p. 172]. "Though Finland is small our Army bears large losses and will bear yet more. They have mostly natural defenses: made of stone or granite. Our projectiles can't damage them. The newspapers say we have 2 thousand dead and 7 thousand wounded, but we have more truly" - people in Leningrad talked like this [17. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 115]. The rumors also reported of the brutality of Finnish soldiers. The Red Army men called them "shyutskorovtsy" [4, p. 20].

Also the rumors appeared in the rearward. Political officials noted wide spread of the defeatist rumors there as well. There was a well-known rumor that the direction to stop the war with Finland was issued because there were 3500 of frostbitten among the 7000 of wounded. There was also a rumor popular among the citizens of Kronshtadt. They talked about a Major who lost both of his legs in fight. His wife left him and his daughter drove her out, gave up study and took care of him [10. Op. 6 s. D. 849. L. 70–131]. Sometimes those who spread rumors found a mare's nest. Thus, the worker of the Uglov limy plant, Zhukova, started a rumor that their colleagues Borisov and Udilin were dead and Kashevarov was badly wounded. However the wives of those men flatly denied this "information" applying to the letters from their "dead" husbands [20. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 123–124].

Another source of rumors was the Finnish part of the population of Leningrad region. They painfully perceived the war and were glad to Finnish successes. Thus, the information reports noted the following incidents:

A certain Vikhlyainen of Finnish nation, the worker of the Oktyabr'skaya Railways, asserted that fighting with Finland the soldiers of the Red Army and its tanks drowned in swamps.

The resident of the village Gakkovo, the Konnovskii Country Council of Kingisepp lotusi region said: "When they took the island Sursari, the Red Army men came into a house, heard the noise under the floor and threw three grenades. That's what the Soviet Army do!" There's no doubt that such information was received from Finnish radio broadcasts. They were popular among the Finnish part of Leningrad region population. However the rest part of population of this region had doubts also. Ivanov, the guard of the Os'misk RK CPSU(b) said: "There are innocent people killed in the Finnish front-line as long as in the rearward the directors-scallywags have no risks. They earn 800 rubles as long as the Red Army men earn only 8 rubles." Semenova, the cleaner of the Os'minsk primary school, asserted that the Finnish army was supported by a large number of Swedish volunteers, so the could defeat the communists in a short future. Egorov, the accountant of the kolkhoz "Pushkino" of the same region noted: "The position of our army is bad. If there was Trotskii governing, he would not let things go this way".

Nikolaeva, the worker of the kolkhoz "Stal" of Kengisep region, said: "The Bolsheviks send the soldiers in Finland for fighting and make them starve. The Red Army men would better fight bolsheviks instead of the Finns" [17. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 61].

There was a variety of rumors in the rearwards connected with the assurance that betrayal and enemies of the people activity were the reason of failures:

The Red Navy man Rozhnov claimed that he he heard in Leningrad that the commander of the Baltic Fleet Tributs was unmasked as an "enemy of the people" [10. Op. 6c. D. 849. L. 131].

"Rumor has it that there's a sabotage made top by commanders. The Red Army soldiers were equipped with greatcoats and boots. Many of them were frostbitten," – said the typist of the Kingissep region Executive Committee, Alik.

"The Commander of the front-line on the Finnish border happened to be an enemy of the people so Voroshilov himself is ruling the front", – told his colleagues the supply manager of the gang "Krasnyi shveinik" of Vsevolozhsk region.

A part of such statements was connected with the disbelief to the official mass-media.

One of the company "Zagotles" workers heard that 10 Finnish planes were shot down and noted: "They do not say how many of our planes were shot down."

Often the lack of official information provoked people to make their own conclusions. "I've heard Budennyi betrayed and yielded a lot of Red Army men prisoner. I stood on the platform and saw the echelon full of Red Army soldiers, but they were not wounded. They must have been sent to Moscow. There must be something wrong there, but they do not tell us. My relative from Donbass wrote me that there was something wrong there, so I think that they take those soldiers to Donbass." This statement shows that its author, Mariya Zhuravleva, even did not clearly understand where Donbass is located, but the tone of her words represents the decline of the loyalty to official mass-media [17. Op. 5. D. 4530. L. 116].

Leningrad was also a source of rumors. It was caused both by the closeness of the front-line and the lack of official information, it provoked people to make their own conclusions out of what they saw.

The mechanism of spreading rumors and their source are represented by the case on the repair ship "Hammer & Sickle". On the 7th of February, 1940, the turner Timopheev came back to the ship. He was asked about the life of Leningrad citizens and the news from the front-line. He answered that everything was okay in Leningrad and there was nothing new in the front-line. He also mentioned Leningrad rumors and retold them though he told that they hardly are true. To the question of

where he heard them Timopheev answered quite typical for that time: "I've heard it from women in the queue" [9. Op. 7s. D. 52 s. L. 19]. He was not the only one who applied to this significant source of information in The USSR.

The period from the end of December, 1939, to the 12th of February, 1940 can be accounted as a period of top-activity of the rumors. The second Soviet attack on the line of Mannerheim changed the situation. The successes of the Red Army together with the improvement of informational background contributed to it. Starting from the 15th of February and to the end of the war there was no information about any rumors in cities, regions, Army and Fleet.

As a conclusion let us make some notes. As it was mentioned above, the rumors had great influence on the morale of Leningrad and Leningrad region people in 1939–1940. All in all they were of defeatist nature and influenced the people negatively.

There are three kinds of rumors that appeared and penetrated to the Navy in the period of the Soviet-Finnish war:

The rumors which appeared in the military and navy surrounding, aimed to explain the failures of the Soviet army. For this purpose, they exaggerated the military potential of the enemy and absolutised the failures of The Red Army.

Another kind of rumors appeared in Leningrad and countryside of the Northwestern region. People were ready to believe any alternative information as soon as they did not get official reports. The rumors spread widely and acquired various details. However it should be noted that the rumors of countryside were of tougher nature. It was connected with the whole emotional background of Soviet countryside of that period.

One more type of rumors is Finnish disinformation which was spread through the Finnish mass-media and radio broadcasts of some Western countries. Considering the last ones let us note that they used both the techniques of "double standards" and "partial truth". These rumors were spread by the Finnish part of the population of Leningrad region, who negatively perceived the war and those intellectuals who had the access to western sources of information.

Such wide spread of rumors and gossips in the period of the Soviet-Finnish war was reasoned by the lack of full official information in the Soviet mass-media. Let us mention also partial loss of confidence to the official sources of information though it was not absolute.

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The Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War in assessments of the Allies and the Enemy

Советское государство в годы Великой Отечественной войны в оценках союзников и противника

The article explores personal opinions and assessments on the Soviet Union and its historic role of political and military leaders, as well as those of the general public from the countries of anti-Hitler coalition and Nazi Germany, which they voiced during the war.

В статье исследуются размышления, мнения и оценки политических и военных деятелей, представителей общественности стран антигитлеровской коалиции и фашистской Германии о советском государстве и его роли, которые они высказывали в годы войны.

Key words: The Great Patriotic War, the Allies, the Enemy, Premise conditions, Military and economic potential, the Soviet state and its role, Political system, opinions, estimates.

Ключевые слова: Великая Отечественная война, союзники, противник, предпосылки, условия, военно-экономический потенциал, советское государство, его роль, политическая система, мнения, оценки.

The Great Patriotic War (part of the WWII from the moment the Soviet Union entered the war in 1941 till Nazi Germany's defeat in 1945) was the most dramatic challenge in the history of our country. Along with the Nazi Germany, ten other European countries joined the war against the Soviet Union. Other European countries sent volunteer divisions to the Eastern Front. The German Army Chief of Staff F. Halder recalls that on June 30, 1941 Adolf Hitler specifically discussed the issue of "unification of Europe in a joint war against Russia" with the General Committee [7, p. 55].

So why did the Soviet Union, which is usually depicted by the rivals of our Fatherland as a state where everyone lived "in a state of fear" and "nothing was right", not only survived the war, but eventually defeated the Nazi Germany and its allies?

The victory in the War was attributed to a number of interrelated factors of economic, social, military, spiritual, and political nature. In recent decades, for political and tactical reasons these factors have

been forgotten or omitted. In some cases, the significance of such wartime reality-based factors as the unity of the front and rear, planned economy, friendship among different nationalities, Soviet education, in the history of the War and the Soviet's eventual victory, are being denied. The unity of the country's leaders and the people, the role of the Socialist party, Soviet political system, the Supreme Commander and others, are being subjected to ridicule and humiliation, distorted, denied or forgotten. As a result, a significant number of modern people consider these factors as propaganda. However, Soviet veterans, as well as war allies and enemies, regarded those factors as the most important prerequisites for success and victory.

Not only in the West, but also among the post-Soviet circle, there have been numerous attempts to replace the core meaning and consequences, as well as to negatively present the role of the Soviet Union, and to diminish the contribution of the Soviet people and the Russian state in the defeat of the aggressor and the liberation of other nations. Therefore, the article covers only statements, opinions and estimates expressed by the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, the military, and the people of the allied countries, along with the enemy of the Soviet state during the War.

The invaders originally envisioned the Red Army to be defeated in the "blitzkrieg" (was fast as a lightning) within six to eight weeks, and the Soviet state, torn by internal contradictions, would collapse. Secretary of War Stimson G. in June of 1941 reported to the US President Roosevelt that Germany was to defeat the Soviet Union "in one month or at most in three" [6, p. 14]. The British Lieutenant-General D. Brauning wrote in January of 1942: "I remember very well hearing it in June of 1941, when Hitler made his unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union, that the Germans were to be in Moscow in three weeks. It was not the official point of view, however, such a belief was widespread..." [17, p. 172].

However, due to growing resistance of the Soviet people and later military successes, opinions of the Soviet state, the army, and the people's ability to repel an aggressor, were changing. They had to admit that the Red Army fought bravely, was not going to give up or turn their bayonets against the Soviet system. Politicians and experts were trying to identify the reasons for such strength of the Soviet state. One of the first Ministers of Propaganda in the Nazi Germany, J. Goebbels, who before the War believed that "Bolshevism will collapse like a house of cards," on July 2 wrote in his diary: "The Red regime mobilized the people", thus recognizing the power of the Soviet state [11, p. 321]. Shortly after, on August 11, 1941, F. Halder wrote in his diary: "The overall situation is making it more obvious and clear that the Russian colossus ... we have underestimated. This statement can be extended to all administrative and organizational aspects, on means of

communication and, in particular, on Russian military capabilities" [7, p. 264].

The German Intelligence Agency, which studied the mood of German soldiers and ostarbeiters, based on the analysis and observations, reported in 1942 by the authorities that the Soviet political system "actions of the State Political Administration do not define the essential part of life in the Soviet Union, as was previously thought" [8, p. 95].

German experts and the general public gradually realized that the Soviet social system provided a decent level of education and health, brought courage and collective solidarity [8, p. 93–95].

The Security division Commander on the Eastern Front Sepp Dietrich noted the intelligence and trainability of the Soviet citizens in his observations. "Very intelligent people, healthy by nature, manageable, and quick to understand technical aspects. ... These huge modern factories, agricultural institutions – it is just grand..." [10, p. 271].

Adolf Hitler, who aimed at the destruction of the USSR, in July of 1942 in a close circle mentioned that in "ten to fifteen years Russia would become the most powerful nation in the world, and it would take two or three centuries to change the state of things." He noted the uplift living standards of the population, development of industrial centers and the railway system "which was not yet on our maps," highly appreciated the Stakhanov movement, continuous success "in the education of the Russian workers", and ambitious plans for economic development.

The Soviet political system, according to B. Shelenberg, G. Mueller, J. Ribbentrop and other prominent functionaries of Nazi Germany, was identified with Stalin, who, Hitler stressed, "also needed to be treated with due respect" [14, p. 13–14, 18, 35].

The proof of courage of the Soviet people can be found in official statements, telegrams and memoirs of political and military leaders of the Allies during World War II. During the war, their assessments and attitude towards the struggle of the Soviet people underwent several changes, depending on military and political situation, alignment of political forces within the country, nature of relations between the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, and a number of other factors. However, intact was the recognition of the contribution of the Soviet people in the fight against the common enemy. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for instance, in his letters to the Soviet political leaders "expressed admiration of the brilliant success" of the Red Army. In February of 1943, he wrote that the chain of extraordinary victories restricted him from finding the words to express his admiration and gratitude towards the Russian military [12, p. 49, 121].

Churchill emphasized that the Red Army dealt the German army "a fatal blow, which could not be done by any other army in the world" [5, p. 1].

"We are amazed at the power of the Russian resistance and the skill with which it is carried out, – Winston Churchill wrote to his wife in October of 1941. We sincerely admire the valor, fortitude and patriotic self-sacrifice of the Russian people" [12, p. 219–220].

Paying tribute to the struggle of the Soviet people, the Allies began to evaluate military, economic and political leadership of the USSR more objectively. Those military successes evoked interest in the Soviet political regime, the one that created a strong army with strong spirit.

Admiring the courage and resilience of soldiers of the Red Army, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in February of 1942 in a letter to Joseph Stalin mentioned that such greatness could only be achieved by an army with able leadership, "strong organization, adequate training ...". He also pointed out that the political system of the country were to ensure the unity of the army and people [13, p. 76].

The British weekly "The British Ally," concluded that the development of the post-revolutionary Soviet Russia made it "an important and valuable factor in the life of Europe and in the development of European civilization." The Editorial office had an opinion that political system, social and national structure of the Soviet Union allowed it to solve a number of pan-European issues, including the position of women in society, relationship between the nation and others [3, p. 9].

Other members of the Allies believed that the Soviet system contributed to the establishment of such prerequisites for victory, as the implementation of large-scale industrial projects, provision of "ethnic democracy and freedom in education," the unity of the people, and high political consciousness of the army and the people [4, p. 1, 5]. In June of 1942, the British internal counterintelligence concluded that public opinion attributed success of the Red Army to the Soviet political system. On the brink of 1942 and 1943, it again mentioned the sympathy for the USSR among the workers and their interest in the Soviet social and political system, for which the Soviet people fought selflessly. D.A. Belov states that English historian F. Bell "based on an analysis of the British press, came to a conclusion that it represented the Stalingrad battle as a Stalin's personal victory and largely a victory the political system" [2, p. 74].

Analysts believed the Party to be an important element of the political system of the Allies. In 1944, American researchers noticed that the Party was becoming bigger and stronger as "communists had leadership, programs, and, moreover, means. When there was a need for a feat, communists had their pamphlets. When a song was needed to

improve the morale, they had a song, very inspirational. When there was a need for very scarce building materials, the Party channel was the fastest way to bypass the bureaucracy of the wartime". Analysts noted that the presence of the Party could be felt everywhere: in army units and guerrilla groups, military factories, collective farms and theaters, on the radio and in the press, at educational institutions and government agencies. The Party "was the cement that sealed the bricks of the Stalinist fortress" [15, p. 11–17].

A generalized description of the role of the political system in achieving victory was given by US experts. In March of 1943, the US President's Committee on protocol relations with the Soviet Union prepared a memorandum for Mr. Hopkins – Advisor and Special Assistant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The document concluded that the Soviet Union was a decisive factor in the war and it needed to render all possible assistance. "In Russia, the dictatorship, perhaps the most absolute of all that has ever been in the world – said the authors of the document. Russia is very proud of the successes achieved under this dictatorship. There is no doubt that without this dictatorship, Germany would have won the war" [9, p. 168].

After the war, the CIA gathered specialists from different departments and compiled a report on the possible consequences of Stalin's death, for a narrow circle of senior US officials. The report noted the decisive role of Stalin in the political system, emphasized that he had "turned Russia into an industrial and military power ... and repulsed the German invasion of the Soviet Union ... led the people of the USSR to the greatest military victory in Russian history" [1, p. 32–33].

Thus, both Allies and the enemy were compelled to recognize the significance of the Soviet state and its political system in creation of prerequisites and conditions necessary for the conduct of the war.

Important parts of this system were Stalin and the Communist Party, which played an important role in ensuring the ultimate performance in the conduct of all state and military activities.

The established ruling system was able to function in extreme conditions of war, allowed the accumulation of all forces and resources of the country and its people for achieving victory.

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Participation of Soviet military specialists in the armed conflict in Nicaragua (1981–1990)

Участие советских военных специалистов в вооруженном конфликте в Никарагуа (1981–1990 гг.)

The history of Russian-Nicaraguan relations is rather brief. It was only in 1944, when official diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua were established. The countries became very close during the years of 1979-1990, when the Sandinista National Liberation Front held power in this Latin American country. During those years, Nicaragua has become the second most important strategic partner of the Soviet Union in Latin America, after Cuba. However, since 1991, due to dramatic internal political changes in both countries, official contacts were reduced to a minimum.

In late 2007, Daniel Ortega was once again elected the President of Nicaragua. Ortega, who quit radicalism since the Sandinista revolution, has not, however, lost the sentiment for the former "country of victorious socialism." At the same time, Russian political leaders, after a string of diplomatic defeats and betrayals in the 1990s, turned to the course on strengthening the idea of a multi-polar world, and restoring relations with many "third world" countries, which were formerly under the political patronage of the Soviet Union.

The above-mentioned circumstances led to the rapprochement between Russia and Nicaragua, this time on equal terms, as well as to a significant intensification of diplomatic, economic and trade, and cultural contacts between the two countries.

История российско-никарагуанских отношений весьма непродолжительна. Лишь в 1944 г. между Советским Союзом и Никарагуа были установлены официальные дипломатические отношения, которые стали по-настоящему тесными только в период 1979-1990 гг., когда в этой Латиноамериканской стране у власти находился Сандинистский фронт национального освобождения. В указанные годы Никарагуа становится вторым по значению стратегическим партнёром СССР в Латинской Америке после Кубы. Однако с 1991 г., на фоне радикальных внутривнутриполитических изменений в обоих государствах, официальные контакты сократились до минимума.

В конце 2007 г., в результате демократических выборов президентом Никарагуа вновь становится Даниэль Ортега, во многом отошедший от радикализма времен Сандинистской революции, но не утративший симпатий к бывшей «стране победившего социализма». Со своей стороны, высшее политическое руководство России, после допущенных дипломатических поражений и предательств периода 1990-х гг., реализовывало политику укрепления многополярного мира, восстанавливая отношения со многими странами «третьего мира», которым раньше активно покровительствовал Советский Союз.

Указанные обстоятельства обусловили сближение между Россией и Никарагуа на равноправных началах, а также заметную активизацию

дипломатических, торгово-экономических и культурных контактов между странами.

Key words: Geopolitical interests, Military experts, Socialist countries; Sandinista revolution; A. Somoza dictatorship; Contras; Military and technical assistance; International duty; Revolutionary regime; D. Ortega government.

Ключевые слова: геополитические интересы; военные специалисты; страны социалистического лагеря; Сандинистская революция; диктатура А. Сомосы; контраст; военно-техническая помощь; интернациональный долг; революционный режим; правительство Д. Ортеги.

In recent years, Russia has been returning to the path of extensive cooperation with Asian and Latin American countries in order to meet its geopolitical interests. To some extent, this task is made easier by the fact that in these regions many countries still retain a grateful remembrance of the political support and significant economic and military assistance once provided by the Soviet Union.

Therefore, despite all the global changes which have taken place both in Russia and all over the world, Russian diplomacy is setting its course on resuming close and equitable cooperation with countries, which still gravitate towards the former Socialist camp. This, in turn, is an important aspect of Russia's contemporary international policy.

According to S.A. Karaganov, "... one of the main geopolitical objectives of the Russian Federation in recent years has been the resumption of political, economic, and military cooperation with one of the Central American countries – Nicaragua. During the years of 1979–1990, in this Latin American country prevailed a political regime, originated from the so-called "Sandinista revolution", and remained loyal to the Soviet Union and the entire Socialist camp..." [7, p. 187].

In fact, in July of 1979, the twenty-something year struggle of the Nicaraguan people with the clan of the dictator Anastasio Somoza came to an end. The Sandinista National Liberation Front, which came to power, elected its leader Daniel Ortega as the new head of Nicaragua. After becoming the ruling party, the Sandinistas nationalized the mines and forests, and expropriated vast estates (haciendas) to hand them over to landless peasants.

According to the researcher N.M. Grant: "... they have performed a true social revolution, but their loyalty to the Communists and close ties with Cuba provoked hostility from the US government. In addition, Sandinista's requests for aid from the US were followed by condemnation of past and present US policy, along with support of communist rebels in El Salvador. All those factors contributed to the formation of the opposition to the Sandinista government, which was largely supported by the United States..." [1, p. 341].

The core of anti-government forces, known as the Contras, were the guards of the ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza, as well as the Native Americans and African-Americans from the coast of Miskito, whose antagonism to Managua went back in history. The main leader of the Contras was John Negroponte, who served as the US Ambassador to Honduras since 1981. Later, he carried out a similar mission in Iraq, and in early 2005 was appointed to the position of the Director of National Intelligence of the United States.

The Soviets, Cuba and other socialist countries could not remain indifferent to the civil war that flared up in Nicaragua. In 1982, Daniel Ortega visited Moscow, where he outlined the needs of his country. Shortly after, the Soviet Union began to supply Nicaragua with arms and high-level specialists.

The military historian P.Y. Kuznetsov states that "... within the first year of Daniel Ortega's service, from the Soviet Union Nicaragua received 57-mm anti-tank guns, 122-mm howitzer D-30 and 152-mm howitzer D-20. In 1982, Nicaragua received the first batch of 122mm rocket launchers BM-21, capable of firing a volley on the area of 40 missiles. By the end of 1987, the Nicaraguan government troops were armed with 60 heavy guns, 30 BM-21, more than 120 anti-tank guns, and hundreds of mortars. Since 1980, the country began to establish its system of Air Defense. To equip it, the Soviet Union supplied anti-aircraft guns LSD-4 ZU-23 and M-1939, as well as the rocket surface-to-air backpack. In 1984, the Nicaraguan Air Defense were given 100mm anti-aircraft guns KS-19. In total, by the end of 1987, there were about 400 anti-aircraft guns and more than 350 surface-to-air missiles as part of the Nicaraguan air defense units. In addition, the country has received 3500 military trucks from the GDR; more than 800 GAZ cars, 40 conveyors for T-55 tanks, about 75 fuel tankers and other vehicles from the USSR and other countries of the Socialist block.... " [2, p. 412].

In a short time, with the active participation of Soviet and Cuban specialists virtually the entire Air Force of Nicaragua was recreated. Since 1982, military specialists from the USSR were sent to Nicaragua on a regular basis, among whom were instructors on mechanized infantry, armored and aviation units, and GRU officers of the Soviet KGB.

Researcher P.I. Novikov adds: "... the first aircraft, received by the Sandinistas, were Soviet AN-2. Later came four Italian training machines SF-260, obtained from Libya, and then six Soviet transport planes AN-26 and military helicopters. By the end of 1987, in the Nicaraguan Air Force, there were more than 40 Mi-8/17 and 12, MI-24, which in the US called "flying tank" ... " [6, p. 95].

Along with the growth of the amount of military equipment supplied, Nicaragua initiated construction of new and expansion of old airfields.

One of them, Punta Huete in Managua, had the longest runway in Central America, which could accommodate any kind of military aircraft.

After the revolution, Nicaraguan Navy additionally received two French patrol boats, eight Soviet and four North Korean patrol boats, two Polish and two Soviet trawlers. In 1983, Nicaragua began creating a network of radar stations, which by the end of the 1980s turned to be incomparable to the rest of the region [5, p. 332].

In 1987, the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense issued an illustrated booklet tracing the path, made by the Nicaragua armed forces after the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza's regime, and the Sandinistas' shipments of weapons from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. According to these reports, before the revolution in Nicaragua, there were only a few American tanks dated back to the Second World War (of which only three were possible to operate), and 25 Staghound armored cars.

The overall situation with the military and technical equipment of the Sandinistas' armed forces changed dramatically with the socialist countries', and, above all, the Soviet Union', supplies.

Thus, in mid-1981 the country received the first Soviet T-55 tanks, and by the end of 1984, their number reached 110 units. In 1984, the Soviet Union supplied Nicaragua with about 30 amphibious tanks PT-76, armed with a 76-mm gun, more than 250 armored vehicles, mainly BTR-60 and BTR-152, as well as scout BRDM-2 [8, p. 358].

In total, according to American estimates, the total cost of military equipment supplied to Nicaragua by socialist countries by mid-1987 amounted to \$2 billion.

According to military historian A.I. Molchanov "... between the years of 1978 to 1990, Nicaragua was visited by 688 Soviet soldiers, including 77 soldiers on duty. Often they were involved in military action along with Cuban units. According to unofficial data, in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s, there was also a significant number of Soviet military intelligence personnel. Their task was to train locals the methods of sabotage and guerrilla warfare..." [3, p. 152].

Soviet military doctors also worked in Nicaragua along with the military personnel. The number of doctors amounted to 76 people, who worked on yearly rotation in Nicaragua until January of 1991.

In 1982, when the north of the country was severely damaged by heavy flooding, the Soviet Union sent to Nicaragua a tent hospital, which was set up on the outskirts of Chinandega. The hospital contained 100 beds and was equipped with machines from Hungary, Germany, and the United States. Medications in a form of humanitarian aid came from England, India, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Brazil and other countries [4, p. 291].

Thus, participation of Soviet military and civilian personnel in the Nicaraguan conflict was limited, meaning, first of all, exclusively material and technical support. During the civil war in Nicaragua, Soviet specialists obviously supported the revolutionary Sandinista regime, which, in turn, reflected the interests of the majority of the common people of Nicaragua.

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V.N. Benda

The national historiography of the contribution of General Feldzeugmeister Petr Ivanovich Shuvalov to the development of Artillery and Engineering in Russia in the middle of the XVIII century

Отечественная историография о вкладе генерал-фельдцейхмейстера Петра Ивановича Шувалова в развитие артиллерии и инженерного дела России в середине XVIII в.

The article analyzes some of the national sources, which contain different perspectives on the fecundity of the reforms carried out by P. I. Shuvalov in the fields of Artillery and Engineering in the middle of the XVIII century. The author focuses on the fact that a lot of researches belonging to reputable and well-known military historians, researchers and groups of authors contain completely opposite views on the authorship of those or other artillery tool project, which was accepted for arming of Russian Army in the end of the 50-s of the XVIII century. Some of these points of view by the way do not correspond to the historical reality.

В статье анализируются некоторые из отечественных работ, в которых приводятся различные точки зрения на результативность реформ, проведенных П.И. Шуваловым в области артиллерийского и инженерного дела в середине XVIII столетия. Автор акцентирует внимание на том факте, что во многих работах и исследованиях авторитетных и известных военных историков, ученых и авторских коллективов, изданных в разные периоды, иногда приводятся совершенно противоположные мнения по поводу авторства тех или иных проектов новых образцов артиллерийских орудий, разработанных и принятых на вооружение русской армии в конце 50-х гг. XVIII в., причем некоторые из них не соответствуют исторической действительности.

Key words: the middle of the XVIII century, General Feldzeugmeister, P.I. Shuvalov, The Russian Army, The Artillery, The Corps of Engineers, the ordnance.

Ключевые слова: середина XVIII в.; генерал-фельдцейхмейстер; П.И. Шувалов; русская армия; артиллерия; инженерный корпус; артиллерийские орудия.

According to the Empress Elizabeth I decree from the 31th of May, 1756, The Earl Petr Ivanovich Shuvalov was appointed Chief of The Artillery and The Corps of Engineers (General Feldzeugmeister – V. B.)

[1. D. 960. L. 16]. He became the seventh General Feldzeugmeister and the second of Russian nationality. By that time Russian Artillery and Corps of Engineers functioned without a chief for a long time because there was nobody appointed this position after the sudden death of the previous General Feldzeugmeister, V.A. Repnin, in 1748. The long-time absence of the head of The Military Collegium (1746–1760) and the head of The Office of Artillery and Fortification (1748–1756) caused the decay of these two central departments of military control. It negatively influenced the organization of everyday-life of The Russian Army in general and The Corpses of Artillery and Engineers in particular.

The situation was perfectly described in the report to The Coferention (the deliberative department of Elizaveta Petrovna's time consisted of close to The Empress people which influenced the functioning of central departments of the state governance including The Senate and The Collegiums – V. B.). According to this report The Artillery «... in conditions of the frequent change of lower-rank commanders and concomitant this defects and failures The Artillery has come in such a deplorable state...», that without new chief appointment there will be very complicative, maybe even impossible, to reform the organization of The Artillery and The Corps of Engineers [1. D. 958. L. 15 ob.].

The researches of the artillery and engineering development history published in the pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet periods contains a lot of materials about The Earl Petr Ivanovich Shuvalov and his activity in the civil and military fields [2, p. 300–308; 4, p. 41–51; 5, p. 180–263; 11, p. 262–271; 13, p. 479–490; 16, p. 28–29; 17, p. 225–240, 259–262; 18, p. XXXVII–XLIV etc.].

The national historiography have few negative opinions and estimations of the results of P.I. Shuvalov's activity as a Chief of The Artillery and The Corps of Engineers, the evaluations mostly are positive.

As an example, well-known Russian historian of The Artillery, The Lieutenant General N.E. Brandenburg noted that «... the Shuvalov's period, despite it did not last for a long time, was one of the most operose and substantial periods, the more that all the time it was accompanied by outer military events, in which the artillery played an important role. The Seven Year's War gives a variety of military merit to the Shuvalov's artillery ...» [4, p. 58].

The teacher of The Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy, The Colonel A. A. Nilus noted that P. I. Shuvalov managed to make the right conclusions of the defect of Russian artillery of that time – insufficient maneuverability and a large variety of the ordnance, – and tried to solve this problems by creating such ordnance system that could remain in arming up to the introduction of the rifled artillery [11, p. 264].

The main merit of P. I. Shuvalov as a Chief of engineers is that he, without an introduction to anything new, systematized everything established before his assignment. The Earl Shuvalov's ruling The Corps of Engineers was lightest page in the history of this department for the second half of the XVIII century [18, p. XLII–XLIII].

Well-known Soviet historian of The Artillery, The Major-General of The Artillery D. E.Kozlovskii, noted that the period after Peter I in the history of artillery development was stagnant. Even if any changes existed they mostly worsened the situation. Professor D.E.Kozlovskii thought that widescale and favorable changes of the Russian artillery came with the P.I. Shuvalov's appointment to the position of General Feldzeugmeister. Though he was not an artilleryist, «... he introduced a lot of new and useful things thanks both to his initiative and ingenuity and to inventors» [8, p. 80].

«The history of national artillery» tells us that after the stagnation of the second quarter of the XVIII century the rapid development came in the middle of this century. The Russian ordnance produced not long before The Seven Year's War was the best in the world and later its design features were borrowed by Western artillery [5, p. 265].

One of the contemporary researches tells us that the Russian artillery has acquired its former glory with the beginning of The Seven Year's War, when the influential and enterprising Earl P.I. Shuvalov was appointed to the position of the Chief of artillery. He has fundamentally reorganized artillery and armed it with the perfect ordnance [14, p. 70].

The excellent results of artillery transformations made by P.I. Shuvalov were even caroled by M. V. Lomonosov [17, p. 26]:

С Елизаветой бог и храбрость генералов
(There are The God and generals' bravery with Elizabeth)
Российска грудь, твои орудия, Шувалов.
(the Russian chest, your ordnance, Suvalov.)

The famous Russian historian and academic, Vasillii Osipovich Klyuchevskii, wrote about P.I. Shuvalov: «There is a stirring entrepreneur-inventor of the Peter I epoch who resurrected in the Elisabeth's Senator, The Earl P.I. Shuvalov. The financier, the codificator, the land surveyor, the military organizer, the tax farmer, the engineer and the artilleryist, the inventor of the special «secret» howitzers, that made a lot of wonders in the time of The Seven Year's War. Shuvalov was supposed to have an answer to any question and to have a solution project to any problem, especially to the financial one» [6, p. 283].

There are different perspectives on the authorship of new types of ordnance in the military historical literature of different periods. Some sources say that the inventor of the new types of ordnance was P.I. Shuvalov, the other consider the artillery officers Bishev,

M.V. Danilov and M.G. Martynov to be the inventors. The last say that P.I. Shuvalov gave their inventions for his own ones.

N.E. Brandenburg does not cast doubt on the P.I. Shuvalov's involvement in the invention of new types of the ordnance. Describing this or that new type of the ordnance Nikolai Efimovich underlines the authorship of P.I. Shuvalov by using such phrases as: «the most significant Shuvalov's project is the project of the long howitzers suggested by him in 1757» [4, p. 45], «... Shuvalov managed to apply in practice his new ordnance...» [4, p. 46] and so on.

N.E. Brandenburg in his research makes not a single mention of Bishev, Danilov and Martynov.

Another well-known historian of national artillery, A. A. Nilus, casts doubt on the categoricity of M. V. Danilov's assertions about the fact that there were he and Martinov who invented the new types of ordnance, so-called «bliznyata» and «unicorns», and P.I. Shuvalov just used their projects. A. A. Nilus noted that at the same time «... lots of others try to take away the honor (meaning the Shuvalov's honor of the authorship of the new types of ordnance – V. B.) ...» [11, p. 262–263].

The research of the group of authors «The history of the national artillery» categorically asserts that «the inventors of «the unicorns» were the outstanding Russian artilleryists, M.V. Danilov and M.G. Martinov» [5, p. 262].

Another research of the same kind, «The Artillery», says that the significant innovation in the ordnance «...has become the new type of the ordnance invented by M.V. Danilov and M.G. Martinov and named «the unicorn»» [10, p. 22].

Yet another research describing the history of the Russian artillery development during the six centuries even doesn't mention the new types of Russian ordnance in the beginning of the XVIII century. It only mentions in passing that Russian artillery showed off its outstanding quality in the period of The Seven Year's War [12, p. 38].

To be fair lets note that the researches of the Soviet historians also contain opposite opinions. Thus the Soviet military historian, D.E. Kozlovskii, directly points that the authorship of the «unicorns» and «secret new-invented howitzers» projects belongs to P.I. Shuvalov [8, p. 81].

Considered to be a military historian A.B. Shirokorad wrote that mentioned in «The Atlas of the new artillery» samples of 6- and 12-pounders guns in fact were the prototypes of the universal artillery guns, the so-called «mortar-kanon» invented by the captain of Artillery, Bishev, in the beginning of the second half of the XVIII century, and that Shuvalov in «The Atlas ...» has not a single reference of the author of the invention (meaning Captain Bishev – V.B.) [16, p. 28].

Basing on everything mentioned above it is possible to say that the authors of national historiography do not come to an agreement on the authorship of the new types of ordnance («bliznyata» and «unicorns») and the fact of Shuvalov's involvement in this process. Some assert that the samples of these types of ordnance were designed by Danilov and Martinov [5, p. 186–187, 262; 10 p. 22], some give preference for P.I. Shuvalov [4, p. 45–46], yet another authors admit the authorship of P.I. Shuvalov and M.V. Danilov [3, p. 21], and there also were the researchers who supposed «... the engineer Martinov» to be the inventor of the new types of ordnance guns [9, p. 78].

As a conclusion lets note that the question of the new types of ordnance systems authorship itself is not so significant in the process of reformation of the artillery organization structure and its rearmament with the new types of ordnance in the end of 50-s – the beginning of 60-s years of the XVIII century. The fact to pay attention to is that the new weaponry performed much better tactical and technical characteristics than the systems of the previous period. The new ordnance guns had better maneuverability as they were lighter in weight than the previous ones; they also required bigger firepower and combat rate; they also were easier in use and service; the number of the artillery calibers was reduced as well.

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**Professional training of historians
at The Institute of Red Professorate in the 1920-s**

**Подготовка кадров историков
в Институте красной профессуры в 1920-е гг.**

The article explores the professional training of historians at the Historian Department of The Institute of Red Professorate in the 1920-s including the syllabus, teaching stuff and students, party and scientific activity of the students.

В статье рассматривается подготовка кадров историков на историческом отделении Института красной профессуры в 1920-е гг., в том числе программа обучения, состав преподавателей и слушателей, партийная и научная работа слушателей.

Key words: The Institute of Red Professorate, M. N. Pokrovskii, A. N. Slepков, S. M. Dubrovskii, history in the USSR, higher education in the USSR, scientific discussions in the 1920-s, the discussion about the social and economic formations, Marxist historians.

Ключевые слова: Институт красной профессуры, М.Н. Покровский, А.Н. Слепков, С.М. Дубровский, историческая наука в СССР, высшее образование в СССР, научные дискуссии в СССР в 1920-е гг., дискуссия об общественно-экономических формациях, историки-марксисты.

After taking the power in October, 1917, Bolsheviks needed to create the Marxist History and prepare the stuff of Marxist historians. For this purpose in the first years after the Revolution there were Marxist research centers established. The Institute of Red Professorate (IRP) was one of them [22; 23].

The Institute of Red Professorate was established in 1921 for the purpose of professional training of Marxist teaching stuff in social sciences [33]. Up to the 1924 there were 3 main departments in this institute – Economics, History and Philosophy. Later some more departments were opened but The Department of History remained one of the biggest. The department of Party and History was opened in the IRP in 1927. It prepared historians of The Communist Party. The term of study at the Institute was three years, in 1924 it was increased to four years [9. D. 53. L. 4; D. 438. L. 44–45].

A lot of Marxist scientists and bolsheviks with pre-Revolutionary experience used to work at the IRP in the 1920-s. Well-known Marxist historian, the student of V.O. Klyuchevskii, Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovskii

(1868–1932) was the Head of both the Institute and its Department of History up to the death. Besides him in the early years of the Institute the seminars on history were led by the other well-known Marxist historians: Vyacheslav Petrovich Volgin – the specialist in history of the socialist ideas, Nikolai Mikhailovich Lukin – the specialist in history of French Revolution, later he became the Head of the Institute of History of The USSR Academy of Sciences. Besides them there were L.N. Kritsman, E.S. Varga, V.I. Nevskii, F.A. Rotshtein, Yu.M. Steklov, D.B. Ryazanov among the teaching staff in various periods [9. D. 2. L. 32, 50, 62, 85; D. 438. L. 44–45].

The lack of the Marxist historians caused the necessity to apply to the historians of pre-Revolutionary tradition. In various periods of the 1920-s the following representatives of «old school» worked at the IRP: the historian of the Middle Ages and Modern times – Aleksandr Nikolaevich Savin; the historian-medievalist – Evgenii Alekseevich Kosminskii; the student of V.O. Klyuchevskii, former Menshevik, – Nikolai Aleksandrovich Rozhkov; the well-known historian Aleksandr Evgen'evich Presnyakov and others. Petr Ivanovich Lyashchenko, the specialist in agrarian history and history of national economy, taught at the Department of History for a long time [9. D. 6. L. 30–33; D. 2. L. 50, 54, 73, 99–100; D. 438. L. 44–45].

The Department of History from the very beginning was divided into the sections of Russian and Western history (in the end of the 1920-s they were renamed into the section of the USSR People History and the section of Western History). The early syllabus of the Department was rather inconsistent. The first year of study presumed exploring the questions of theoretic economics and also the study of World History: Ancient Greece and Rome, the history of culture, the feudal period. The second and the third years presumed taking part in the seminars on historical materialism and the specialty [9. D. 2. L. 47, 50, 54].

Starting from 1926/1927 the syllabus started to change. Since that time the first year of study was dedicated to exploring social and economical history of Russia of XVI–XIX centuries for the students of Russian section and the Western history of the same period – for the students of Western section. Besides these disciplines there was also the seminar on philosophy. During the second year of study the students attended the classes of history of the XIX century (or historiographic seminars) and during the third year of study – the classes of history of the XX century. Such principle worked up to the 1930-s [9. D. 260. L. 5–14, 33, 51].

The main and almost the single form of study in the Institution of Red Professorate in the 1920-s was taking part in seminars. Students worked out a question by themselves and then took part in the discussion of reports. There were almost no lecture courses and even if

there were any, they were optional to attend. It was supposed that in conditions of lack of the professors-communists it would be better to let party youth study those or other questions by themselves, than to delegate nonparty professors to lectures.

The use of historical sources was obligatory for getting the report for the research seminar accepted. The students were to work with documents, foreign literature, archive materials. Such an attitude was posed not only due to its innovative nature but also due to the fact that a lot of questions had never been explored before. The Alumna of IRP, the historian E.B. Genkina, said that during the discussion of her report «The February revolution» in 1926 at the seminar on the history of The October revolution M.N.Pokrovskii said: «That's not a research ..., because little of archive materials were used ... it can't be a research without using and studying archive materials» [7. p. 263].

The works of students based on lots of historical sources often were of investigative nature. That's why yet studying at the institute such students published a large number of articles and books which discussed historical questions from the Marxist point of view. Thus Marxist History was forming. The literary activity was a part of the study process. The students collaborated with various newspapers and magazines – «The Marxist historian», «Under the flag of Marxism», «The bulletin of the Communistic Academy», «The Bolshevik», «The proletarian revolution» and so on. That's why the IRP has become both the study and the research center. For the period of 1921–1928 years its graduates have published 559 scientific articles and other scientific works and 1468 popular-science works excluding the newspaper articles and reviews [11, p. 87]. The Institute itself has published several festschrifts [36].

The development of Marxist History required first of all the study of economic development and class struggle. That's why at the Russian and Western sections the Revolutionary epoches were in focus mostly. A lot of researches came out of the M.N.Pokrovskii's seminar that was devoted to The First Russian revolution of 1905–1907. It dealt with the large variety of topics like the development of industry and labor movement of the XX century, The October strike, The December armed revolt, Soviets in revolution, the position of the RSDLP and bourgeois parties, the activity of the I-st and II-nd Dumas etc. A lot of the reports of those who attended the seminar were published to the 20th Anniversary of the revolution [1; 2; 13; 24; 30; 31; 32; 34; 35].

In the 1920-s special attention at the IRP was paid to the study of the French Revolution held under the guidance of the well-known Marxist historian N. M. Lukin. In 1922–1923 he conducted the seminar on the history of The Convent, in 1923–1925 – on the Jacobin dictatorship. The last one was attended by S.D. Kunisskii, Kh. G. Lur'e, S.M. Monosov, V.N. Poznyakov and others [5. D. 2. L. 50]. Large attention was also paid

to the study of labor movement in the countries of Western Europe [18; 20; 25; 26].

From the very first year of the IRP agrarian researches were in focus. First of all, on the seminars of P. I. Lyashchenko devoted to the history of the national economy in the end of the XIX – beginning of the XX century. A lot of publications have come out of that seminar [5; 6; 8; 29]. The authors of them tried to prove that after the Reform of 1861 Russian agriculture developed in a capitalistic way.

Exploring the questions of social and economic development and class struggle the students of IRP also studied the peasant movements under the leadership of S.T. Razin and E.I. Pugachev [4; 17; 18]. They aimed to prove that peasant revolts were of progressive nature, that they were caused by the social and economic reasons and the increasing of exploitation. Showing the antiserfdom and antifeudal directivity of the peasant revolts the «red professors» tried to prove that the rebels strived forward to the bourgeois relations. It led to the conclusions that the peasant revolts were of bourgeois nature.

The post-Revolutionary time required comprehension, first of all about the October revolution of 1917. The Bolsheviks supposed it to be the most important event of the XX century. That's why the seminar on the October Revolution held by M.N. Pokrovskii was one of the most significant disciplines at the section of Russian history. It was established in the 1925/1926 academic year [27. D. 26. L. 28–29]. The seminar covered a wide variety of topics including the events of the period after The First World War. Large attention was paid to the substantiation of the consistent of the revolution. That's why a lot of topics were devoted to the reasons of the revolution: the social, economic and political development, the labor and peasant movements. As a result of the seminar activity, there were 2 volumes of «The Essays on the History of the October revolution» published. In the 1925/1926 academic year there was the seminar on the events of the 1917th year held at the Russian section of the IRP [27. D. 26. L. 28–29]. Its activity resulted in publishing of a large number of the researches on the Civil War [3; 10; 12; 14; 16].

The special attention at the IRP was paid to the study and criticism of the non-Marxist theories. The activity of the historiographical seminar held by M.N. Pokrovskii was of great importance at that point. The seminar aimed to represent an author as a member of a certain class. Publishing two volumes of the digest «Russian historical literature in the class context» was the result of the seminar's activity [28]. The slavophiles, B.N. Chicherin, S.M. Solov'ev, A.P. Shchapov, P.L. Lavrov, V.O. Klyuchevskii, P.N. Milyukov, N.A. Rozhkov, were described in the digest as the members of their epoches. Paying great attention to the exposition of those theories and showing their «wrong nature», the

students of the seminar also noted the contribution of a historian to the development of a History of his time.

Also there was a historiographical seminar held by N. M. Lukin conducted at the section of Western History. It focused on the questions of the French revolution [9. D. 51. L. 14]. The students attended the seminar studied the works of A. T'er, O. Min'e, A. Tokvil', A. Olar, Zh. Zhores, M.M. Kovalevskii, I.V. Luchitskii, N.I. Kareev and others [15; 20; 38; 39].

The professors and the students of the History department of the IRP also used to take part in big scientific discussions of the 1920-s: about the socio-economic formations, the financial capital, N.G. Chernyshevskii, «Narodnaya volya». The students of the IRP participated in the activity of the First All-Union Conference of Marxist Historians which took place in December of the 1928 – January of the 1929. The students V.N. Rakhmetov, A.I. Lomakin, A.P. Shokhin represented their reports there [37].

The seminar work had great influence on the academic rating. Up to the middle of the 1930-s there was no transfer exams as well as no marks. The control on the study was taken by the registration of the reports and speeches [9. D. 2. L. 96–100].

Beside the academic work, the students of the IRP were to do party and teaching work as well. Practice was a part of the study process and was taken into account while transferring a student to the next year of study. Teaching work required holding courses on the corresponding specialty at the higher education institutions, workers' schools and preparatory department of the IRP. Party work required teaching at the district party schools, leading the Marxist and agitational-advocacy groups at the manufactures etc. The party work was supposed to show the level of Marxist background of the students. Such importance of the party work was motivated by the fear of «academism» and the pursuit to create the «new type of scientist» (the «red professor»). In the 1920-s Marxist methodology and active political position was supposed to show the difference between the Marxist historians and the bourgeois historians.

Thus, the IRP has become the educational, scientific and party-ideological center. This could not but affect the special features of the professional training of the Marxist historians. For five years (1924–1928) the Institution was graduated by the 194 students. 32 of them were Russian historians and 18 of them were Western historians [11, p. 86]. There were such well-known historians as N.N. Vanag, E.B. Genkina, P.O. Gorin, B.B. Grave, S.M. Dubrovskii, I.I. Mints, S.M. Monosov, A.M. Pankratova, A.G. Prigozhin, S.G. Tomsinskii among them.

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THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

УДК (47)«1851/1917»

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The spread of Jadidist ideas in the Kazakh steppe (Second half of the of the XIX – early XX centuries)

Распространение идей джадидизма в казахской степи (вторая половина XIX – начало XX вв.)

The article explores the penetration of Jadidist ideas in the Kazakh intellectual environment in the second half of XIX – early XX centuries. It is shown that they have led to significant changes in the fields of education and culture, and influenced the political development of the region.

В статье рассматривается процесс проникновения идей джадидов в казахскую интеллектуальную среду во второй половине XIX – начале XX вв. Показано, что эти идеи привели к существенным преобразованиям в сфере образования и культуры, а также повлияли на политическое развитие региона.

Key words: pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, Jadidism, Kazakhstan, modernization, ulama, Sufis, ishany, intellectuals.

Ключевые слова: панисламизм, пантюркизм, джадидизм, Казахстан, модернизация, улама, суфии, ишаны, интеллигенция.

The boundary of the XIX–XX centuries is the most interesting period in the modern history of Kazakhstan. The intellectuals of Kazakhstan were divided into several groups according to the model of political and spiritual development that has been forming from the middle of the XIX century. Two geopolitical models were formed: pro-Russian and pro-Turkish. The Islamization of Kazakhstan in the XIX century manifested itself in infiltration of Islamic customs and rites in the culture of Kazakhs, the increase of Arabian names and Arabian words in the Kazakh language. All of this resulted in the formation of political movement and Islamic party later. Religion became not only the foundation of spiritual life of the Kazakhs, but also was esteemed as part of national identity. The number of both clerical literature and writers increased. There were Shaihislam-ulu Zhusupbek, Shakhmardan, M. Umanchikov, Shakarim Kudaiberduev among them.

The Islam became the means of struggle for national independence of all Muslims of the Russian Empire and began to play a

leading part in national identification of the Kazakhs. Now, the loss of religion was equal to the loss of national individuality. The presence of Islam in the steppe caused the formation of a new identification model, which the intellectuals tried to work out. As a matter of fact, the intellectuals were the major carrier of national identity. In intellectual circles it was considered that the national standards of the Kazakhs did not come up with European ones, in fact they hopelessly fell behind. The increasing political activity enabled better understanding of political rights and freedoms and promoted the search for new ways of political development.

The intellectuals of Kazakhstan faced a new model of political development at the beginning of the XX century. Pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism were the most influential trends. In many respects the concepts of these trends coincided in the role and the religion's influence on the society. They were formed under the influence of The Ottoman Empire spiritual leadership and represented ideological trends, based on the concepts of supernational, religious and ethnic identity.

The genesis of Turkish nationalism started with the constitutional reforms of 1826 in Turkey. These reforms started the chain of events promoting the development of "Young Turks" revolution. The group of Turkish young people was especially active in the 1867–1871 in Europe, driven by the ideas of freedom and constitution.

The ideas of Turkism spread among the intelligent Muslim minorities in Russia under the influence of The Ottoman Empire in the middle of the XIX century and were limited by the problems of religion and education. Gradually Muslims in the Russian Empire acquired their own leaders. Ulama, Syphii, Ishans and Jadids were Muslim elite of Central Asia. Adeeb Khalid proposed a preliminary definition of that can be called the Jadids, namely, “those individuals who took part in efforts to reform Muslim society through the use of modern means of communication (...) and new forms of sociability” [2, p. 137].

The problem of Muslims' survival was embodied in the movement of Jadidism, the philosophical basis of which touched all parts of public life: modernization of Muslim theology, freedoms for women, educational reforms, the creation of a new unified literary language etc. There was made an attempt to create a new identity, common for all Muslim Turks of The Russian Empire in a pan-Turkish form.

In the XIX century two educational concepts in conformity with two geopolitical vectors were popular among the Kazakh intellectuals. N.I. Ilminskii (1822–1891) supported one of them according to which the Christianity went ahead of russification. Through the native language of training he aimed to lay fundamentals of orthodox religion. In the XVIII century General Major Skalon published the ABC – book of the Kazakh language based on the Russian alphabet. N.I. Ilminskii published “The

Self-teacher of Russian for the Kirghiz". I. Altunsarin was the Ilminski's follower. I. Altunsarin was a gubernia secretary, the colleague adviser (collezhsky sovetnik) and became the councilor of state (statsky sovetnik) shortly before his death. Altunsarin was an inspector of Kazakh schools, he also published the "Kirgizskaia Khrestomatia" in 1879, and in 1888 he took the position of a Turgay region supervisor. There were two ideas among the Kazakh intellectuals: the first – "Children, let's go to school" (the poem by I. Altunsarin, the middle of the XIX century); the second – "Wake-up, Kazakh" (expressed by M. Dulatov in his collection of poems "Wake-up, Kazakh"). The second concept of education was represented by Jadids.

The Jadids promoted educational reforms based on global science achievements together with keeping national traditions and the Muslim doctrine, had special influence. The most of the Jadids were the sons of rich merchants and industrialists, had secular and spiritual education and had large travelling experience.

There was Mergani among the leaders, who had the largest influence on the reformation of Islam in Russia. He was the leader of the Kazan Tartars. In many respects his success was promoted by that fact, that Kazan was a large cultural center of The Russian Empire, and that Tatar merchants traveled a lot and had trade points in all of the Eastern cities (in Bashkiria, along the Middle and Lower Volga, Kazakh steppes, Turkestan etc).

The Jadid movement differed from other reformist trends of Islam. The two regions had a strong influence in Kazakhstan: the Crimea and Povolzhie, as well as Bukhara and Khiva. Ismail Bey Gaspirali, Abdul Kayyum Nasiri, Huseyin Feizkhani – their contribution to the development of Jadidism among the Turks of The Russian Empire was great.

Gaspirali (1851–1914, Crimea Tatar) became a leading advocate of the Turk-Tatar unity and of the modernization of the Muslim lifestyle. He was "Berenche moghallym" or "The first Teacher" for the Muslims of The Russian Empire. The term for the system of instruction which he devised for the Muslim schools, *usul' dzhadid*, or "new method" came to be applied to Gaspirali's entire program, the adherents of which became known as Jadids. His model of school in Baghchesarai had an enormous influence on Muslims all over Russia. Moreover, his newspaper "Terjiman" (The Translator) circulated widely among the Muslims of Russia, including those in Central Asia. As early as 1885, "Terjiman" had 200 readers in Turkestan. Gaspirali visited Central Asia twice. Under his influence the maktabas were established there in 1898, and in Tashkent in 1901. More than 5000 Jadid schools were established in Muslim Russia before the Russian revolution.

Abdul Kayyum Nasiri (1824–1902) played a similar role. Moreover he wrote the “Tatar Phonetic Dictionary and Manual of Grammar” and also collected the popular literature of the Kazan Tatars and published it in two encyclopedic collections. Huseyin Feizkhani was a European-educated scholar and Orientalist who advocated the Europeanization of Tatar culture and the modernization of the school system and curricula.

Also, the Jadids established many journals and newspapers, such as *Sadoi*, *Turkiston*, *Aina*, *Samarqand*, *Bukboroi Sharif*, *Taraqiy*, *Shuhrat*, *Khurshid*, *Tujjor* etc. Through these journals and newspapers they appealed to the intellectuals.

The first attempts to establish the system of education in Kazakh steppes made by The Russian Empire date back to the XVIII century. So, in 1789 the Asian school for children of Kazakh elite was open in Omsk. "Ustav o Sibirskikh Kirgizakh" 1822 in chapter six "Ustanovleniia dukhovnue i po chasti narodnogo procvescheniia" paragraph 249 stated: "Each Kirghiz has the right to send his son to an educational institution inside the Empire on the general rules". Further, in paragraph 250 it was written: "In putting up schools, except for the ones assigned at clergy, Kirghiz must not be prohibited, but promoted by all possible means" [5, p. 420].

In 1841 Zhangir Khan opened the school in the Bokeevskaya Orda. Since 1868 it was decided to open elementary schools in each Kazakh settlement. Russian-Kazakh schools, special classes and departments at universities of St.-Petersburg, Omsk, Irkutsk, Kazan were built for «natives», the so-called "inorodcheskoe" population of the Empire, including Kazakhs. Gradually, the society formed new stereotypes of life. Tendency to getting knowledge, making successful career and changes in life stimulated the inflow of young people to educational institutions of different levels. A number of these secular intellectuals got university education in Russia. Mustafa Chokaev, Bakhutzhon Karataev, Mukhamedzhan Tinishpaev, Bakhutgeri Kulmanov were their typical representatives, whose activities went parallel to those of the Jadids. Secular intellectuals and Jadids had some differences in their views. The Jadids stuck to the modernization of Muslim cultural tradition of Central Asia while the secular intellectuals were influenced by European thought and culture. The Jadids appealed to the Muslim society to achieve cultural changes; the secular intellectuals appealed to the Russian State and Russian society to achieve political changes.

Ch.Valikhanov, I.Altunsarin, Abai were the first Kazakh enlighteners, whose ideas had pro-russian orientation. The peculiarity of the Kazakh enlightenment was to emerge not only as reaction to the backwardness in the world-wide development; it had its own roots as well.

Eventually the ideas of Jadidism were picked up in Kazakh steppes by Chokan Valikhanov, the leader of the Kazakhs. Born in nomad

environment, he became a conductor of Russian liberalism and western ideas. Being a supporter of the "educated monarch – educated people" concept, Chokan attempted personally to carry out this idea, participating in the elections of an aga-sultan (senior sultan), but intergeneric disputes and enmity prevented him from doing it. On the other hand, he, like Naziri before him, who conducted private lessons and wrote works of literature, translated the Kirghiz epos "Manas", popularized works of well-known akims (minstrels), wrote articles on the history and culture of Kazakhstan.

Abai Kunanbaev, an indisputable authority, was one of the first enlighteners. He shared the most of Jadids' ideas as the necessity of education, its advantages for the personal development. The dignity and the intellectual code are described by Abai in his "Slova Nazidaniya" (in "Slovo 25 and 32"). "It is necessary to learn in order to know what other people know to become equal among them, to become protection and support for your own nation. If you want your son to become a worthy man, send him to school! Don't grudge your wealth!", – wrote Abai [1, p. 30]. It is possible to comprehend sciences, in his opinion, through Russian mainly: "... The Russians will open our eyes into the world... Russian science, culture are the keys to the world treasures" [1, p. 39–40].

One of the preachers of the "new-method" in Kazakh education was Muhammed-Salim Kashimov. In his articles he aimed not only to outline the pedagogical guidelines for teachers and schoolchildren, but also to formulate the hints for everyday life. Thus, in the book "Propaganda", he recommended giving up cramming, but stimulating children's interest in the lesson instead. Kashimov paid special attention to the female education. Jhusup Kopeev stuck to the similar ideas of education. However he did not see the necessity of Russian education, considering, that, sending children to Russian schools, the Kazakh parents chucked away their children as a part of the nation.

We would like to mention the works of Kashimov: "Vezhlivost", "Kniga Razuma", "Nastavlenie kazakham", in which he urged Kazakh people who, in his opinion, were "in lethargy", to wake up and, like other peoples, to strive to getting knowledge, education. "Science is inexhaustible wealth, with which neither pearls nor gold can be compared, which people long for. The wealth comes and goes. Today a man is rich, tomorrow he can remain without a penny. Unlike it the science is the wealth, which does not decrease, but on the contrary it increases, when it is used" [4, p. 156]. Kashimov paid special attention to the education of women, considering that the future of the nation in many respects depends on the education of mothers of the families.

The Kazakh language became a literary language from the second half of the century, besides Kazakh mullahs aimed to preach an Islam

and to read Koran in the Kazakh language. Shakarim acted as preacher of a Mohammedan exegete in his work "O musulmanstve" (About Muslim Religion). He explained original postulates of Islam, translated fragments from the Koran into the Kazakh language. Besides that, Shakarim spent a lot of time developing new imperative of behavior. "It goes without a doubt that a person should get an education and apply to the knowledge and skills in the utilization of infinite natural resources" [7, p. 110]. Later Shakarim wrote: "Honest work, conscientious reasoning should become the basis of a person's good life. They are the three dominating qualities. Without them the peace in life is impossible" [7, p. 110].

The first newspaper was established in Kazakh steppes in 1888, it was the *Dala yialatanun* (Stepnaya Gazeta). One issue of the newspaper *Qazaq* appeared in Troitsk in the summer of 1907. In 1911, the *Kazakhstan* (4 issues) appeared in Urda, and again in 1913 (14 issues) in Ural'sk. In 1912 in Orenburg Kazakh intellectuals started publishing the second newspaper *Qazaq* which was published until 1917 and edited by A. Bukeihanov. In 1913, the *Ishim dalasy*, appeared in Petropavlovsk. From 1911 to 1915 the newspaper *Ai-Kap* (88 issues) edited by M. Seralin appeared in Troitsk.

In English literature two names referred to in the description of Jadidizm in Kazakhstan: Ahmed Baitursunov and Myrzhaqyp Dulatov, whose activity fell on the beginning of the XX century and concentrated on the problems of education and literature [3; 6, p. 260]. In our view more names should be mentioned.

Ahmed Baitursunov received some tutoring from Tatar mullahs in his village and then finished the Russian-Kazakh school. In 1895 he completed the four-year Kazakh teachers' institute. Baitursunov's activity as a poet and later – editor – of the newspaper "Qazaq", linguist, spread his influence through most principal Kazakh centers. Ahmed Baitursunov was a truly important political figure at the Soviet period too. Myrzhaqyp Dulatov was a teacher, famous poet and politics at the same time. Dulatov advocated the education reform, the emancipation of women. He emulated Bukeikhanov and Baitursunov in many activities.

In the Soviet times practically all Jadids were killed in camps and prisons as the enemies of people, thereby they were blacked out from people's memory. By 1938 the most famous of them mounted the podium at the Great Purge Trial in Moscow as part of the "anti-Soviet bloc" of "Rights and Trotskyites" to face the fatal charges of counterrevolution and anti-Soviet activity, the Jadid generation was obligated. They were replaced by a new generation, whose education and worldview were shaped entirely within the Soviet context. Today, when the Republic of Kazakhstan enters the second decade of the independence, revision of history, recovery of historical justice to these

people is a vital problem not only to law enforcement bodies, but to the nation as well.

On the turn points of history historical memory of the people becomes more acute, they turn consciously to the past, give new non-traditional definitions, occasionally at variance with the established assessment of facts, actions of separate persons. One of the historical personalities who left a vivid heritage in the history of Kazakhstan people is Magzhan Jhumabaev /25.06.1893–19.03.1938/, who was ousted out from peoples' memory by the Soviet power.

On the surge of developing revolutionary movement in Russia and in the conditions of a definite increase of the Kazakh culture the whole pleiad of national intelligence emerged. The political views were rather motley, but united by the one purpose – education of the Kazakhs. Magzhan's world outlook was formed under the influence of the historical events of the day. He was lucky with the teachers and trainers. One of them was Ahietden Ahanov a young Bashkir, who spoke many oriental languages and taught arithmetic and geography. Magzhan's father wanted his son to be a mullah and in 1905 Magzhan went to the Petropavlovsk Seminary. Muhamedzhan Begishev was its founder and teacher. The latter completed a course of studies in the Istanbul University in Turkey. Subsequently the seminary became a significant educational center with Arabian, Persian, Turkish languages as major subjects along with the history of Turkish peoples.

Magzhan was the first who realized that understanding was not enough to wake people to a new life and to lead them to creation. Thus the new motives in his works and presentiment were that Russia faces an abyss. The symbol of revolution in the poem "Freedom" is an angel with diamond wings, insulted by peoples' wrath. He wants to abandon the Earth. The country is wrapped with blood and demonic passion; it has lost support, and October of 1917 will hardly be followed by happy days. Alash leaders noticed Zhumabaev and admitted to the regional committee, then was nominated as a deputy candidate of the Constituent Assembly and a member of commission on compiling textbooks for Kazakh schools.

The victory of the October revolution took Zhumabaev unawares and for some time he abided in confusion. He didn't accept Kolchak, who advocated monarchy. It changed his attitude to Alash and took the side with the Soviet Power. Later Magzhan edited Bolsheviks' newspaper, contributed to the newspaper "Ak-Ghol". In 1918 Magzhan was arrested for the first time. He spent his sentence in Omsk prison and survived by a miracle. The revolution punished and forgave inexplicably.

Fortunately, Zhumabaev avoided the mutation of poetic consciousness and did not become mouthpiece of party political propaganda, but retained his education activity. Unfortunately for a long

time the readers had no free access to the works of Zhumabaev, it was impossible to find his verses. Everything connected with the name of the poet was carefully carved or cut out. However his verses were passed from generation to generation, set to music and sung as national songs, as "Sen Slu" /You are Beautiful/.

The revolution marked a turning point in the history of Central Asian Jadidism. Jadids formed a separate group in the society and continued to take a leading position after the revolution of 1917. One part of them became Mohammedan communists, others joined the party of bol'sheviki. The majority of them played a leading role in cultural life. Jadids attempted to create new society by composing Mohammedan, Turk and Soviet values. However Jadids' triumph in the Soviet period was short. Already in the end of the 20-s the situation began to change. The consequences for the Jadids activity were disastrous.

The movement of the pan-Turkism had a defensive nature from the very start and its cultural contents dominated political ones. The reason of popularity of its cultural and educational ideas is that on the boundary of the centuries the national liberation movement in Kazakhstan entered the new phase of development. The armed form of struggle gave way to the political means (socio-political press, participation in a Muslim fraction in State Duma etc.). The struggle for national independence grew up into the struggle for preservation of national culture and ethnic consciousness. The Soviet social science treated pan-Turkism as bourgeois-nationalistic, reactionary trend. The idea of ethnic, religious, cultural unity of Turkic peoples contradicted the official ideology of merging into one nation under the aegis of the Slavic peoples of the USSR. All of this became the reason of not only ideas, but carriers of similar views eradication. This policy resulted in the annihilation of practically all Jadids in the 20–30-s.

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**The clergy and laity reaction to the confiscation
of church values campaign of 1922 in the provinces
of Central agricultural region**

**Реакция духовенства и мирян на кампанию 1922 г.
по изъятию церковных ценностей в губерниях
Центрального Черноземья**

The article analyzes the problems which accompany the confiscation of church values campaign of 1922 in Soviet Russia. The problems are exemplified with cases in the provinces of Central agricultural region. The true reasons for holding this campaign are represented using central and local archives data. There is also the clergy and laity reaction to the tactic of church values confiscation committees in the provinces of Central agricultural region characterized.

В статье анализируются проблемы, связанные с проведением кампании по изъятию церковных ценностей в Советской России в 1922 г. на примере губерний Центрального Черноземья. На фактическом материале государственных центральных и местных архивов показаны истинные мотивы властей по проведению кампании по изъятию церковных ценностей. Дается характеристика ответной реакции духовенства и мирян на действия комиссий по изъятию церковных ценностей в губерниях Центрального Черноземья.

Key words: The Russian Orthodox church, the clergy, the laity, church values, starvation, famine relief, renovationists, the Soviet government, donations.

Ключевые слова: Русская православная церковь, духовенство, миряне, церковные ценности, голод, помощь голодающим, обновленцы, советская власть, добровольные пожертвования.

The economics of Russia damaged by the Civil War responded very bad to the recessive quantity of grain ingathering in several regions caused by crop failure. The countryside ruined by the politics of the war communism could not operatively fill the grain lacks of regions. The next drought happened in Volga region in the summer of 1921 and caused great starvation. The lack of supply covered the regions of Siberia, Crimea, some parts of Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. The starvation of about 25 million people lasted to the summer of 1922.

Due to this, the head of the Russian Orthodox church, patriarch Tikhon, applied to all Russians and blessed a donation of non-liturgical church values for famine relief [1, p. 4].

In conditions of increasing scopes of the tragedy The Central Executive Committee produced the decree about the expropriation of museum treasures for famine relief on the 2nd of January, 1922, and the resolution – on the 26th of February, as an addition to this decree. This addition ordered local authority to expropriate from churches “all precious things made of gold, silver and gems, expropriation of which anyway would not touch the religious cult itself, and transfer those items to the departments of People's Commissariat of Finance with the special note – to the fund of The Central Commission for starving”. However the interests of the religious cult were determined according not to the church canons, but to the resolution of the government [15, p. 285–286].

In return the patriarch rose to the defense of the Church by coming out on the 28th of February with the letter “To all orthodox church loyal progenies”, where he claimed that, “from the Church point of view this act (the resolution of The Central Executive Committee – S.E.) is the act of sacrilege and we with our sacred duty are to clear the Church's opinion about this act and to let our loyal progenies know about it. Owing to the extreme hard circumstances we allowed the donations of non-liturgical and not-consecrated religious items. We still invoke believers to such donations ... But we can't adore the expropriation from the temples – even as a donation – of consecrated stuff, which is forbidden to be used in any way, but liturgical by the canons of the catholic Church, and is punishable as a sacrilege with the anathema – for laity, – and the overthrow of the dignity – for clergy” [11, p. 286–288].

The situation started to develop rapidly and came to the conflict of the 15th of March between the believers and the officials. The conflict took place on the river Shuya.

This was the “invitation” to start massive campaign on the confiscation of church values while the campaign itself was supposed to represent Church negatively and to attack its positions. The organizer of that attack was V. I. Lenin. He shared his plan with Molotov in a top-secret letter from the 19th of March, 1922.

The letter perfectly represents true goals of the church values confiscation campaign:

“... Now there's a single chance for us to defeat the enemy. I give 99 out of 100 that we will succeed... Now, exactly now, when starving people in some regions eat each other, when roads are covered with hundreds, even thousands of dead, – we can and that's why we are to expropriate church values ...

We have to conduct the confiscation of church values in a quick and determined way. This will bring us the fund of several millions of golden rubles... There can't be any work done without it.

... We have to fight the clergy right now. We have to suppress their resistance in such a brutal way that they wouldn't forget it for decades”.

These statements are followed by the tactic instructions of how to organize the campaign. There was no written reports in order not to leave evidences [12, p. 190–193].

According to the V. I. Lenin's suggestions the starvation in Russia was used for the struggle against the Church. The government of the country supposed the national tragedy to be just an opportunity to achieve their foreign and anti-clerical goals. The problems of starving regions were gone on the back burner.

The special features of believers' and clergy's reaction to the expropriation of the church values can be explored basing on the examples of the provinces of Central agricultural region. This region experienced all special features of Bolsheviks' anti-church policy.

The clergy tried to stand against the expropriation, but the methods were different. In Kursk province only the clergy of Oboyanskii uезд opposed actively though the officials expected protests to be larger [7. D. 2631. L. 117]. During the period of the expropriation campaign in Kursk, Voronezh and Tambov provinces there were only 13, 14 and 18 cases of open confrontation recorded. The clergy also agitated people against the expropriation campaign. There were 22 cases of it recorded in Voronezh province, 26 – in Kursk province and 57 – in Tambov province [2, p. 146].

The situation was influenced by the clergy's fear of repressions and the renovative split inside the Orthodox Church itself. Though there were some cases of clergy's anti-Soviet agitation, the most of them stayed calm. The laity opposed most actively. There was a case in Belgorod uyezd of Kursk province when the expropriation of church values was held with military power, but the clergy did not prove themselves at all [7. D. 2631. L. 78]. In Ampilovskaya volost of Timskii uyezd the officials were able to make an expropriation only after the arrest of 6 people [4. D. 674. L. 103].

There was only the priest of the Zamost'yanskaya church, who refused to give away the church values without a special patriarch's order in Sudzhanskii uyezd. But finally, after the talk with officials, he had to agree [4. D. 674. L. 59].

The passivity of clergy was not accidental. The anti-church terror of the first years of the Soviet period was the reason for it. One of the officials of Belgorod RCP(b) department noted that during the period of the expropriation campaign the clergy remembered the shooting down of bishop Nikon in 1918 and of two priests [4. D. 674. L. 29]. This facts influenced clergy's behavior in 1922.

Finally, it was parish who stood up for church values most actively. As an example, in the suburb of the city Korochi the parish did not let officials to expropriate church values. They applied to the fact that the Church is divided from the State [4. D. 674. L. 87]. In Oboyanskii uyezd there were the parish of the villages Samarino, Shmirevo, Homutsi and

Kotovo, who opposed the work of the Committee [4. D. 675. L. 159], in Kurskii uyezd – there were the parish of the village Boyevo [7. D. 2633. L. 53]. In the village Strel'na, Korochanskii uyezd, there were the priest A. Spesivtsev, the churchwarden V. Netrebenko and 12 parish arrested for opposition to the work of the Committee [4. D. 674. L. 240].

During the expropriation from the Trekhsvyatskaya church near Belgorod the crowd threw stones in the officials. The officials hardly stopped the protests [4. D. 705. L. 35].

In Sudzhanskii uyezd there were three conflicts with believers, who protested against the expropriation. As an example, the Commission decided to take 2 silver vine-bowls for communion from a church in the village Kurilovka. Nobody opposed but the church stuff suggested the officials to take the items by themselves. The officials refused and had to go away [5. D. 36. L. 160–162].

In the village Karachai-Lokni believers did not let the Commission to expropriate the icon from the local church [5. D. 36. L. 15–15 cov.].

In the town Kozlov, Tambov province, angry believers clobbered the officials who tried to expropriate church values, and broke the monument to K. Marks [2, p. 152].

Thus, as long as the government tried to hurt the Orthodox Church and the clergy and supposed their protest against the expropriation campaign to contribute to government's goals, the Commissions often did not expropriate ritual items and even precious icon chasubles. There was no contradiction in that because clergy often stayed passive unlike parish who often tried to oppose the expropriation campaign. The officials had to take people into consideration.

The officials did not want, but had to leave precious things in some churches, because in most cases they took all of valuable items from churches.

At the same time members of clergy were arrested all over Russia. On the 10th of July, 1922, the Central Executive Committee issued the decree, which gave the NKVD the right to exile without a judgment the objectionable persons for the period up to 3 years. Using this decree the officials arrested those of church stuff who might oppose the expropriation campaign [16, p. 90]. For the first half of 1922 there were 55 tribunals held. They examined 231 case of opposing the expropriation campaign and brought to account 732 people [6, p. 285].

Patriarch Tikhon was also arrested for opposing the Soviet government until June, 1923 [10, p. 353].

In the Central Agricultural region there were bishops John Zadonskii and Tambovskii Zinovii arrested. Bishop John was arrested for the propaganda of opposing the expropriation campaign in local mass-media [6. D. 7. L. 3]. Bishop Zinovii was arrested for hiding church values in the Tambov local cathedral [8. D. 462. L. 23].

The officials also recruited members of clergy for recognizing anti-Soviet tendencies in clergy's environment and for contributing to the expropriation campaign. As an example, in Oboyanskii uyezd of Kursk province the priest father Sergeev was arrested for the propaganda against the expropriation campaign. Later he was recruited by the officials [6. D. 7. L. 4].

All in all the only power, beside the state, who supported the expropriation campaign, was renovative church supported by the government. As an example the state expropriation policy was approved during the meeting of renovative clergy of Ostrogozhskii uyezd, Voronezh province [7. D. 2635. L. 47]. In Kursk diocese renovationists from Korochanovsk convicted actions of Kursk metropolitan, who opposed the expropriation campaign, they even called him a pretender [4. D. 674. L. 241]. However the position of renovationists hardly influenced the situation, because the most of clergy stuff did not support them.

The tension increased also with the help of the rumors. Rumor had it that the expropriated church values were sent to France and England in payment of military debts [7. D. 2634. L. 89]. In fact such rumors were kinda true. Later events represented that a part of values was really spent on the things far from the needs of starving regions.

There were 1414 bloody conflicts recorded during the expropriation campaign. 2691 priests, 1962 monks, 3447 nuns and a lot of believers dead or were shot according the sentence [14, p. 106]. However in the Central Agricultural region, such as Kursk and Voronezh provinces, the expropriation campaign was held without serious conflicts [7. D. 2633. L. 118; 10, p. 141].

The exception was Tambov province. There were two bloody conflicts recorded there: in Belorechenskaya volost and Elatomskii uyezd [2, p. 152]. Tough state policy of expropriation was held while the orthodox population of the region donated their money and products as well as church items allowed for donations by orthodox canons.

The campaign was started while church organizations all over Russia started fundraising in favor of starving in Povolzhye [3. D. 258. L. 1; 3; D. 674. L. 4–4 cov. 39]. Clergy and believers wanted to help starving people in Povolzhye without any compulsion [for example: 4. D. 674. L. 72; 7. D. 2631. L. 67, 117]. The church fundraising in the Central Agricultural region was going on in 1923 also [8. D. 462. L. 58; 8. D. 2432. L. 7].

Regarding the amount of collected values, which V. I. Lenin supposed to be millions (or even billions, as he wrote in the letter), it was far from what he expected. According to the "Izvestiya" report, it accounted only about 21 poods of gold, 23 thousands poods of silver and a few gems [14, p. 106]. There were 582 poods of silver, 13 pounds of gold and 3625 gems collected in Kursk province for the 1922 year [13,

p. 183]; about 7 pounds of gold, about 605 poods of silver and 2472 gems – in Voronezh province.

As an example, the chief of the Graivoronskaya Commission, Krasnokutskii, noted the churches of Graivoron gave less values than they were supposed to [4. D. 674. L. 100].

However the political result existed without a doubt. The state has made one more blow to the Russian Orthodox Church. Soviet propaganda represented opposing of clergy and laity to the expropriation campaign as a fact of anti-popular nature of Church.

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THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Practice of Administrative Investigations of the Officials` Malfeasances in the Russian Empire in Early XX Century

Практика административного расследования должностных преступлений государственных служащих в Российской империи в начале XX в.

This article represents the formation of a system of “administrative guarantee” that used to take place in the Russian Empire. It means that neither a committal for trial nor filing a suit against the officials who have committed crimes could proceed without the permission of their superiors. This article explores how this system worked in practice at the beginning of the XX century and analyze the practice of inquests of the officials` malfeasances. The research is based on the comparative analysis of three senatorial inspections results – of Baku and Turkestan provinces and Russian Poland. Also the paper represents the result of a comparative analysis between the assessments made by senatorial inspections and a researcher assessment of the situation in Ural regional administrative system. The research is based on the unique documents from the Russian State Historical Archive (St.-Petersburg).

В статье показано складывание системы «административной гарантии» в Российской империи. Содержанием системы являлась зависимость судебного преследования чиновника от позиции его вышестоящего начальства. Проанализирована практика административных расследований должностных преступлений государственных служащих. Исследование основано на сравнительном анализе результатов трех сенаторских ревизий начала XX века – Бакинской губернии, Туркестанского генерал-губернаторства и Привислинского края. Полученные сенаторами оценки были сравнены также с результатами анализа первичных материалов административно-следственных дел против чиновников, проводимых в рамках губернских администраций Уральского региона. Исследование базируется на источниках из Российского государственного исторического архива.

Key words: administrative guarantee, officials malfeasances, the Russian Empire, senatorial inspection.

Ключевые слова: административные гарантии, должностные преступления, Российская империя, Сенатские инспекции.

I. Introduction

The public administration system has always been an important factor of social development and so it is nowadays. The efficiency of the government structures can be achieved by different means, including self-cleaning of the administration system from those of staff who lowers the bar.

Neither a committal for trial nor filing a suit against the officials who have committed crimes could take place without the permission of their superiors in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the the XX century [1, p. 7, 14, 15]. According to the words of the eminent Russian lawyer V. Maklakov, “even though there is a proceeding stipulated by the law and considered a crime, even though there is the investigatory authority and public prosecutor`s supervision who are officially aware of the crime, they are powerless in case the crime is committed by an official”. The system of “administrative guarantee” made an official responsible insofar as “his bosses would like to make him responsible” [3, p. 247].

The research of the office-work materials on the Ural provincial boards (those boards that acted as administrative justices towards local police officials) has led to such a consequences that at the beginning of the XX century there was a steady informal association of the provincial officialdom in the region. The systematic rescuing of police officials from punishment for malfeasance office constituted its activity. It has been figured out that there was a constant interpretation of any official malfeasance in the accused favour; brining to the court the accused mainly of lower ranks; substitution of the punishment for “including them in the staff” of provincial boards; placing immediate superiors of the accused in charge of the investigation. Each of these points contributed to the development of corruption and demoralization of the officialdom in the Ural region [6, pp.146–152].

Following this line of research, the question arises of whether the existence of the state officials` informal association was a unique peculiarity of the region or it was also typical for other territories of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the XX century.

II. Senatorial inspections in the Russian Empire

It is obvious that the answer to this question could be found in and based on the materials of senatorial inspections. The purpose of the present report is to analyze the way that last century`s senatorial inspections evaluated administrative investigation practice on the official malfeasance carried out by the provincial authorities.

The Senatorial inspections were a form of extraordinary supervision in controlling the local authorities. Being brought into force by the decree issued in 1722, they managed to fit the practice of public administration throughout the XVIII century. The decree of 28th November 1799 (that

remained in force until the abolition of the Senate in 1917) imposed local officials the duty of executing all the inspecting senators' orders.

According to our estimations there were 129 senatorial inspections in Russia (from 1800 to 1917) [2, pp. 84–86]. At the beginning of the XX century the Senate focused on the inspections of the provincial administrations situated in the national outlying areas of the Russian Empire. Three inspections of this kind were carried out. They were the inspections of the Baku province (1905, by senator A.M. Kuzminsky) [10], the Turkestan Krai (the Syr-Darya region, the Fergana region, the Samarkand region, the Semirechensk region and the Trans-Caspian region; 1908–1910, by senator K.K. Palen) [9], the Privislinsky Krai (the Warsaw province, the Plotsky province, the Lublin province; 1909–1910, by senator B.D. Nejdgard) [8]. The latter was initiated because of some information regarding corruption amongst the local officialdom [8. D. 1. L. 1]. Another two inspections assumed to find out the reasons for the Armenian-Azerbaijan slaughter of February 6–10, 1905 [10. D. 1. L. 1–5] and for the transfer of the Turkestan Governorate General from the War Ministry's competence to the Ministry of Internal Affairs [7. D. 48. L. 72–73].

The organization of the governmental authority on these territories was specific. In one region it was the city council who was influential, while in another – the Governor-General's office, as well as in the third – the auls' foremen. However the central element of the system of governmental authority was identical in all of the areas inspected. It was the chain represented by the following elements: “a governor – a provincial board – a city and a district (uyezd) police”. It is significant that the same system was functioning in the European provinces of Russia governed by “General Provincial Establishment” and that this system formed the basis for the governor's power. All these facts assisted the development of the unique research into conditions, which help to provide the comparative analysis of materials without any strained interpretation or wrong assumptions, and to compare the its results with the results of the study of the Ural provincial administrations' activity.

What conclusions were made in senatorial reports?

III. Baku Province's Senatorial Inspection (1905)

While inspecting the Baku province senator A.M. Kuzminsky found it necessary to pay special attention to the quality of investigation of malfeasances in office. He ascertained that the local governor had ignored his duties regarding the selection of cadres in spite of the fact that they were entirely concentrated in his hands. The inspection revealed such egregious cases as filling these administrative vacancies by “knowingly vicious men, knowingly because it was enough to inquire about their service record not to hire them” [10. D. 1. L. 329]. “The

absolute indifference to the staff's quality" was typical for the governor's activity.

According to the senator, the provincial board used to take the police officials accused of malfeasance under its protection. In his report the inspector wrote that the board "doesn't show any interest in and any desire to disclose and eradicate the abuses committed by their subordinate officials" [10. D. 1. L. 315 ob.]. As noted further, in this institution "there is an obvious tendency to terminate the charges against the police officials and not to bring the charges against them even if the provincial board is aware of the facts, which prove that an official has committed a crime and is guilty of it" [10. D. 1. L. 316–316 ob.]. For example, the board dismissed the case of bribe extortion by the police officer because the plaintiff could not specify the exact place of residence of the witnesses [10. D. 1. L. 309]. If it was impossible to "hush the case up", the board delayed the investigation in every way possible. "There are a lot of examples when the provincial board decides to institute criminal proceedings against the police officials 3–5 years after receiving a complaint itself", – wrote the senator. Besides this, the board used to "dismiss charges against different officials" under the pretence of amnesty. So the provisions of the Manifesto of August 11th, 1904 that could "have application only in the sense of the commutation of sentence" served as the pretext for those institutions to dismiss a number of such cases [10. D. 1. L. 317 ob.]. The board placed police officials' immediate superiors and colleagues in charge of administrative investigations of complaints against those officials. The investigators had "a community of interests" with the accused and therefore tried "not to ascertain the truth but to conceal and distort the actual circumstances" [10. D. 1. L. 315 ob. – 316]. It was this attitude that led to the actual "police officials' impunity for criminal acts and mainly for bribery committed by them and its widespread occurrence in the Baku province is largely due to this attitude" [10. D. 1. L. 317 ob.].

As to the practice of administrative investigation of malfeasances in the local police structures themselves, the provincial police did its best to hamper the proceedings on "appeals against improper or criminal actions" of its officials. "Even if this correspondence is based on the instruction given by the Governor and the Provincial Board, it is not executed ad locum and is swept under the carpet for a long time, sometimes for a few months, a year or even longer," – noted A.M. Kuzminsky [10. D. 1. L. 265].

IV. Turkestan Province's Senatorial Inspection (1908–1910)

The inspection of the Turkestan province by K.K. Palen led the senator to the conclusion that "the weakest side of the governors' activity was an absolute lack of control over the subordinate officials" [9. D. 438].

L. 15]. It was primarily expressed in “the condescending, sometimes to the excess, attitude of the regional authorities to malfeasances and their employees` shortcomings”. Circumstances made it possible. For example, in the Samarkand region was possible to appoint to the position of the local police officer the man who had been arraigned on a criminal charge for malfeasances three times by that moment and had been publicly disciplined”. Another typical example was the case of legal prosecution of a local police officer due to assault and battery of the volost estate manager. It “has been left without any motion for a year and a half” and then it was dismissed by the Syr-Darya governor [9. D. 415. L. 8].

Assessing the activity of the local regional boards functioning as the administrative justice, the senator noted that they had a “rather tolerant” attitude to malfeasances. Despite statutory requirements the majority of such cases were not brought to trial but were investigated in administrative proceedings due to that fact that the boards could take an active part in their consideration. Some of the cases were “so dragged out that they had to be dismissed due to the death of the accused” [9. D. 438. L. 16 ob.]. It is also known that even high ranks of the boards were involved in such an investigations. If the accused in malfeasance was sentenced, he/she was assigned an unreasonably lighter punishment than he/she should have been [9. D. 438. L. 61–62]. Most often it was “warnings” or “strict warnings” and their pronouncement didn’t involve financial liability or demotion. Furthermore, one police officer who had been brought before the court for “a number of offenses and malfeasance” eight times was promoted by the Samarkand provincial board in eleven days after his last committal for trial [9. D. 438. L. 41 ob.].

The local police also did not take “timely measures in investigations” of malfeasances committed by its employees, which resulted in the fact that it was, as the senator said diplomatically, “difficult” to find out the truth [9. D. 64. L. 20 ob.].

V. Russian Poland’s Senatorial Inspection (1909–1910)

B.D. Neydgart who inspected the Privislinsky Krai mentioned the following characteristic features of the administrative investigation of their employees` malfeasances carried out by the provincial government [8. D. 17. L. 3]. The governors, according to the senator, had “amazingly indulgent attitude ... to the violators of official duties”. For example, the governor of Lublino officially reprimanded local gendarme ranks because they tried to “make an investigation on the activities of the administration”. In the Plotsk province the district chief, known to the entire population as “a desperate bribetaker”, was not brought to court by the governor, and even was not fired. Those and other facts the

inspections had revealed made B.D. Neydgart inform the Emperor that "with the very rare exceptions official crimes go unpunished" [8. D. 3. L. 15 ob.].

Analyzing the activities of the local provincial boards, the inspector did not consider it possible to provide a generalized assessment of the situation (perhaps the only case of such a kind in the materials under the study). He followed the path of accusing particular representatives of the governing boards (the advisor, the medical inspector, the vice governor) in the exaction from the population, the embezzlement of state property and funds, bribery, etc. [8. D. 1. L. 66] However, the senator noted that there was one general tendency: "many cases of malfunctions... committed by officials had not been investigated for a year or more than that, and those who committed improper and even criminal activities continued to perform their duties". In some cases, a clearly deliberate delay in the investigation by means of useless correspondence resulted in inability to bring the guilty persons to the prosecution due to the expiration of the statute of limitations" [8. D. 1. L. 68].

The peculiarity of the Privislinsky Krai's inspection was that it originally was under the instructions regarding the police, formulated by B.D. Neydgart as: "The obvious shortage of salary they (the police officers. – S.L.) have does not give them the possibility to exist, this fact has encouraged the Senatorial Inspection not to focus an attention on insignificant, with mercenary motives, violations of their duties, and the Inspecting Senator initially assumed not to take into consideration these activities of the officials while carrying out the inspection itself" [8. D. 1. L. 72]. However, having started the work on the spot, the inspectors had to reconsider their positions. In particular, B.D. Neydgart directly pointed the fact that it was typical for the local police to "conceal" their employees' malfeasances. Malfeasance was followed by proceedings and punishment only "by way of exception" [8. D. 3. L. 15 ob.]. The inspection connected the possibility of existence of such a vicious system with the imperfection of current legislation, according to which institution of criminal proceedings entirely depended on the superiors of the accused [8. D. 17. L. 9–9 ob.].

VI. Conclusion

Thus, the study of the materials of senatorial inspections on the activities of provincial governments carried out at the beginning of the XX century shows that the practice of administrative investigations of the officials' malfeasances was in focus. All three inspections estimated the practice negatively. The fact that the issue was regularly raised at the highest level (the report of the senator to the emperor) indicates its importance in the national scope. A.M. Kuzminsky has summarized one of the sections of his report as follows: "Even if we assume that the

examples given above are only particular cases and do not characterize the system as a whole ..., the system admitting the possibility of such a deviation from the norm has to be considered absolutely vicious and be completely condemned" [10. D. 1. L. 312 ob.]. And his viewpoint should be fully accepted.

Indeed, the existence of the steady informal association of the officialdom, the members of which tried hard to prevent its members' punishment for malfeasances, devalued the principle of officials' responsibility for their illegal actions [5, p. 861–875]. It was replaced by the principle of devotion to the superiors and, on a larger scale, to the corporation. That could not but lead to the loss of population feedback. According to the data of inspections, the same problem was characteristic for the highest ranks of the inspected provincial administrations. And the situation in the regions was so typical that the senators even described it in similar words and word combinations. For example, "amazingly indulgent attitude ...to the violators of official duties" (from the report made by B.D. Heygart), "the condescending, sometimes to the excess, attitude... to malfeasances" (from the report made by K.K. Palen) [4].

It is important to lay emphasis on the fact that the territories inspected by the Senate in the early XX century were quite different in terms of their socio-economic, political and cultural development. On one hand, there were the industrially developed, Catholic in spirit, Polish lands, which also formed one of the largest university centers in the Russian Empire and Eastern Europe. On the other hand - the agrarian, predominantly Muslim lands of Azerbaijan and Central Asia in which feudalism and patriarchal peculiarities of the social organization survived. These areas were rather far from each other geographically, they did not have a common border. And there were absolutely different members constituting the commissions who carried out the inspections. Nevertheless, the negative aspects of the activity of regional administrative justice were (in general) of the same type. These facts make the assumption that the situation was not better in other regions reasonable.

As stated previously, at the beginning of the XX century the senatorial inspections of the provincial administrations of indigenous Russia were not carried out. But we have managed to trace the characteristic features of their functioning in the Ural region basing our conclusions on the primary documents. At the beginning of the XX century there were four provinces in this region: the Vyatka province, the Orenburg province, the Perm province and the Ufa province. As regards the management structure the territories corresponded to the norms of "General Provincial Establishment", and thus were identical to the majority of the European provinces of the Empire. The results of our

analysis are completely consistent with the findings made by A.M. Kuzminski, K.K. Palen and B.D. Neydgar who carried out the inspections of the Baku province, the Turkestan Govenorate General and the Privislinsky Krai in 1905–1910.

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**The transfer of authority from Center to regions:
the interaction between the Leningrad Council of National Economy
and the local authorities**

**Передача полномочий от центра к регионам: взаимодействие
Ленинградского совета народного хозяйства
и местных органов власти**

The economic reform of N.S. Khrushchev – the organization of the economic councils in 1957, – contributed to the redistribution of power between the center and the regions. The interaction of new economic structures and local authorities in the late 1950s - early 1960s is explored basing on the materials of Leningrad.

Хозяйственная реформа Н.С. Хрущева – организация советов народного хозяйства в 1957 г., способствовала перераспределению полномочий между центром и регионами. На материалах Ленинграда раскрыто взаимодействие новых хозяйственных структур и местных органов власти в конце 1950-х – начале 1960-х гг.

Key words: Leningrad, Leningrad Council of National Economic, Leningrad City Executive Committee, local Soviets, industry, decentralization.

Ключевые слова: Ленинград, Ленинградский совет народного хозяйства, Ленинградский городской исполнительный комитет, местные советы, промышленность, децентрализация.

In 1957 in The USSR, initiated by N.S. Khrushchev, there was the reorganization of the management of industry and construction held. Due to this there were 105 economic councils established. Later their number was decreased to the 47 ones. The economic councils were assigned to the duties of the disposed ministries. The experiment on the transfer of authority from Center to regions has been held during 1957–1965 years. There was one of the largest economic councils – The Leningrad Economic Council – established in Leningrad. The experiment resulted in increasing of self-dependence of all regional management structures, the Soviets in particular.

This was the first experience of building the relationships between central and local authorities in the Soviet period. The vice-chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee (the Lengorispolkom) Andrei Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov said that the deputy ministers visited the Lengorispolkom before 1957, did it only for the purpose of getting one more building in their terms of reference. There was no need for

establishing strong relationships between the Leningrad City Council and the directors of large factories; their contacts were mediated by a long correspondence with Moscow. The directors of factories did not attend the meetings of Executive Committees [5, p. 2]. The reform made it impossible for the Councils of National Economic to hide from Committees' activity behind the departmental partitions [15. L. 37].

The Heads of the Leningrad Council of National Economic (the LenSovnarkhoz) and the Lengorispolkom together defined the list of the subordinated factories. In summer of 1957 the LenSovnarkhoz requested the transfer of some factories from the Lengorispolkom's jurisdiction under the control of the LenSovnarkhoz. Responding to this The Leningrad City Council (the Lengorsoviet) ordered to transfer 7 prints shops under the LenSovnarkhoz's jurisdiction and thus concentrated the city publishing there [1, p. 5]. On the 8th of July, 1957, the Head of the LenSovnarkhoz Vladimir Nikolaevich Novikov wrote a letter to the Head of the Lengorsoviet Nikolai Ivanovich Smirnov where he substantiated the transfer of the factory “Radist” to his jurisdiction. This was the only factory of radiotechnical section in the Leningrad economic region. The Lengorispolkom was unable to rearrange the production of new models of radio instead of the old ones. In September of 1957 the factory “Radist” was transferred under the LenSovnarkhoz's jurisdiction [2, p. 11].

The Heads of the LenSovnarkhoz built their relationships with the Soviet superiors with great reverence. According to the memories of the official of the Lengorispolkom Vasilii Afanas'evich Golovko, when the LenSovnarkhoz recruited new stuff, it denied the stuff of the Lengorispolkom in order to avoid problems with it [4, p. 374–375]. The LenSovnarkhoz sent a reports of its factories' activity to the Lengorispolkom for each month, quarter, year [8, p. 257–258]. The LenSovnarkhoz and the Lengorispolkom coordinated with each other the supplies, the connections of the subordinated factories, plans for Leningrad building development. The LenSovnarkhoz was allowed to carry out the production, design-prospecting, construction orders of the local Soviets with the condition of using their materials and funding [8, p. 257–258].

Not only the Lengorispolkom applied to the help of the LenSovnarkhoz, it used to be vice versa. In November of 1957 the vice-chairman of the Council of National Economic on the defensive departments S. A. Afanas'ev applied to the City Executive Committee to get the support for the directors of the aviation agency in getting automobiles for duty journeys [17. L. 64]. In the second time the vice-chairman of the Lensovarkhoz Igor' Iosifovich Saf'yants and the Head of technical agency Pavel Denisovich Khizhnyak asked the vice-chairman of the Leningrad City Council Vasilii Sergeevich Tolstikov to

provide them with the nonresidential premise for the needs of a radiotechnical design bureau of the Lensovnarkhoz [17. L. 23]. The members of the Lensovnarkhoz applied many times to the Lengorispolkom asking for the improvement of living conditions or for providing with the industrial premises.

Starting the building of a large factory, the authorities invited the representatives of region councils to be a part of the projection commission. When in 1957 the building of the silicate brick factory in Tosno region was started, the authorities invited the deputies of the region council in order to help in choosing the construction site [17. L. 59]. In 1957 – Summer of 1958 the Lengorispolkom cooperated with the LenSovnarkhoz in improvement of Leningrad city environment (making heat pipelines, asphaltting, etc) [9. L. 130]. In 1960–1962 the departments of the Lengorispolkom and LenSovnarkhoz together built laundries [3, p. 8–9]. Since 1962 planning the building of thermal power plants and water supply stations the Lengorispolkom began to take into consideration the plans of the LenSovnarkhoz and made appropriate corrections in them. This allowed to build the unified system of underground engineer constructions [11. L. 4]. The LenSovnarkhoz also shared its technologies with the Lengorispolkom. Thus in 1964 the Technical Agency of the Lengorispolkom and the Major Leningrad Construction Agency were should have been provided with plastic products produced by the Lensovnarkhoz [12. L. 1].

But in the beginning of the 1960-s centrist tendencies started to prevail in the CPSU Central Committee and the Government of The USSR. They were aimed to enlarge the forms of the industrial management. Local industry seemed to be a good reserve of labor resources and production areas for Sovnarkhozes. By the end of 1962 it produced 11% of the total gross output in the USSR [7. L. 46].

The councils themselves were against the expropriation of industry from them to the Sovnarkhozes. In April 1960 the director and the secretary of Party Bureau of the Major Local Industry Managing Agency of the Lengorispolkom E. Makhin and A. Il'ves and the vice-chairman of the Lengorispolkom A.K. Zernov sent the reports to the chairmen of the Lengorispolkom and the CPSU Leningrad Region Committee. They wrote about the inexpediency of transfer of industry to the Sovnarkhoz. They thought that the tasks of these organizations were not the same. The Sovnarkhoz was busy with the development of heavy industry and producing the consumer goods, so it had no time for producing a large variety of small goods for Leningrad citizens [16. L. 46, 47, 71]. A.K. Zernov in 1961 highly estimated the factory equipment of local industry: "... it is considered that the factories of local industries due to their specificity can't compete with large factories for technical equipment..., but ... however they produce thousands and thousands of

different goods” [19, p. 63–64]. There were the factories which could compete with medium factories of the Sovnarkhoz, such as the “Lenemal'er”. It was considered to be a very good medium factory by the vice-charman of the Lensovnarkhoz Nikolai Nikolaevich Rodionov [18. L. 41].

The turning point of the fate of local industry was the decision of the CPSU Central Committee plenum of 1962 when it was integrated with sovnarkhozes. The top-directors based on the fact that the labor capacity and the quality of production was lower on the factories of local industry than in sovnarkhozes. At the same time the assortment of them was similar: clothes, footwear, furniture [7, p. 45]. The party-government departments reformulated the tasks for local councils of working deputies: “... The main task for local councils of working deputies ... should be taking care of public service, the organization of production should be in the responsibility of sovnarkhozes” [7, p. 46]. It seems that the expropriation of industry from local authorities was the sequel of economic management centralization, characterized the policy of late N. S. Khrushchev's period.

The Lengorispolkom transferred local sewing and light industry under the Lensovnarkhoz's jurisdiction [13. L. 134–135]. There were 107 factories transferred under the Sovnarkhoz's jurisdiction in Leningrad [14. L. 134–135]. The Lengorispolkom kept on providing Leningrad with the housing and communal services, building in the city, the activity of the Consumer Service Agency established in 1957. There was no problem for the Lengorispolkom to transfer to the Sovnarkhoz those factories which were connected with it by the production cycle – “Lentrublit”, etc. However there were special conditions according to which the factories produced raw materials (the “Lenvtorsyr'e”, the metal-carving factory) remained under the jurisdiction of the Lengorispolkom [10. L. 232]. There were three new branch agencies established in the Lensovnarkhoz by September, 1963: the industry of household goods, light industry, the industry of household chemical goods [14. L. 11]. The capacity of industrial production of the factories which remained under the Lengorispolkom jurisdiction to decreased from 15% in 1960 to 7,4% in 1963 [6, p. 23].

Thus the point is that the process of reforming the departments of regional management looked like oscillations of a pendulum. Moving forward from centralization to decentralization and backwards to recentralization again. At the same time the experience of close connecting of the departments of different management levels contributed to the reasonable solution of economical problems, the improvement of citizens' living conditions, the development of self-dependence of Soviet economic figures.

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The monetary circulation on the East of the Ottoman Empire and the buried treasure of the village Dmitrovka

Монетное обращение на востоке Османской империи и клад из села Дмитровка

The monetary circulation in the East of The Ottoman Empire had very special features. This is examples by the mentioned buried treasure. It contained the coins of Russia, Turkey and Western Europe of the XV and XVI centuries.

Монетное обращение на востоке Османской империи имело значительные особенности. Свидетельством этого служит рассматриваемый клад. Он содержал монеты России, Турции и Западной Европы XV и XVI столетий.

Key words: The Ottoman Empire, buried treasure, coin, Russia, thaler.

Ключевые слова: Османская империя, клад, монета, Россия, талер.

Coins are an important historical source. The example of this is the situation that has developed on the East of The Ottoman Empire. In the XV century the Turkish troops conquered the Northern Black Sea Coast. There are few written sources on the Turkish period of the history of this region, especially in regard of the history of economics. Monetary artifacts are the main source on the history of monetary circulation of that time.

In 1898 the police official delivered to The Imperial Archeological Commission the monetary buried treasure which was found in the village Dmitrovka, Akkermanskii apskritis, Bessarabian province. The definition of the coins was made by A.K. Markov [1, p. 116–117].

The information about the buried treasure was published in the «Report of The Imperial Archeological Commission for the 1898 year» in 1901 [12, p. 63 and 176]. After that the interest to this hoarding waned for a long time. The next publication of the treasure appeared in 1988. [10, p. 128–129]. The artifacts of the treasure remained their value to the present days.

Such historiographic case was dictated by the place where the treasure was discovered. It was the South of the Bessarabian province, the steppe zone. In the XV century these lands belonged to the

Moldavian Principality. In the XVI this territory was under control of The Ottoman Empire [6, p. 9–19]. The artifacts of the treasure are memorials of both the history of Moldavia and The Ottoman Empire.

The treasure consisted of 920 silver coins which can be divided into the three historical groups. The first group (96,19%) included 885 akches of The Ottoman Empire. Among them there were 2 coins of the Bayazid's II coinage (1481–1512), 11 – of the Selim's I coinage (1512–1520), 94 – Suleiman's II coinage (1520–1566). The defined places of coinage were the mints of Konstantinopol', Amasiya, Brus, Kanitse, Karakhisar, Kochanie, Novabirda, Novar, Serez, Sidrekipisa, Srebrenitsa, Tire, Uskyup, Edirne. The 778 akches could not be accurately defined [1, p. 116–117; 10, p. 128–129]. Turkish coins are frequent on the territory of Bessarabia [2, p. 275].

The second group (3,58%) included 33 thalers of the Western Europe countries. The special feature of the thalers was a variety of coinage places.

The most of the thalers related to the countries of The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation – 26 items. Those were: the Principality of Saxony: the coinage of Mauritis (1547–1553) – 1 item (1550 year of coinage) and Augustus I (1553 – 1586) – 4 (1554, 1558, 1559, 1564 years); the Duchy Batenburg – 2 (1564 and the one without a year of coinage); the Duchy Bergen: William (1546–1586) – 4 (without a year); the Duchy Brederode: Henry (dead in 1568) – 4 (without a year); the Horn County: Philippe de Montmorency (1530–1568) – 1 (without a year); the Mansfeld County: Gebhard – John – George – Peter – Ernst (1540–1546/58) – 1 (1557 year), Johann – Georg – Peter – Ernst – Christopher (1558–1579) – 1 (without a year); the Duchy of Mecklenburg: Johann – Albert (1547–1576) – 1 (1549 year); the Ostinhen County: Carl – Wolfgang – Ludwig – Martin (1522–1549) – 1 (1544 year); the Ostfriesland County: Eduard – Christopher – John (1540–1566) – 3 (1564 year); the Duchy Rekkheim: Ferdinand I (1556–1564) – 2 (without a year); the Duchy of Jülich and Berg: William V (1543–1592) – 1 (without a year).

The Imperial free cities were represented by the 5 coins: Hameln – 1 (1557 year); Kempten – 1 (1546 year); Lubeck – 2 (both 1549 year); Nimvegen – 1 (1563 year).

1 imperial thalers of the Abbey of Fulda and Torn related to the Church: Margaret IV de Brederode (1531–1577) – 1 (1563 year).

1 thalers of Solothurn produced in the XVI century related to The Swiss Confederation [1, p. 116–117; 10, p. 128–129].

The third group (0,23%) included Russian coins – 2 kopecks of Ivan IV the Terrible [1, p. 116–117]. Russian coins did not contain any admixtures of the earlier coins so it is possible to clarify the period of their coinage.

«Monetary circulation of Russian united state was quickly cleaned of old money after 1535–1538 years» [9, p. 28]. This is explained by the success of Elena Glinskaya's monetary reform [15, p. 100–101]. The kopecks of Ivan IV might relate to the post-reform period.

The point of interest is the way of the inflow of the coins.

The Dmitrovka buried treasure was discovered in the South of Bessarabia, that is directly on the territory of The Ottoman Empire [6, p. 19–26]. The akches can be explained by the internal trade of the Sultan.

Thalers were kind of «international» currency and were widely spread all over the Europe [14, p. 95–107]. In 1578–1599 thalers appeared on the territory of modern Ukraine [8, p. 99]. So the thalers in the treasure can be explained by the international trade.

Russian coins in the treasure arouse interest. On the Ukrainian territory in the XVI century Russian coins are known mostly in Eastern lands which were under control of Moskovia [7, p. 175].

In regard of Russian coins of the XVI century artifacts in Moldova, A.A. Nudel'man had an opinion that «these artifacts represent certain trade and economic contacts that existed between Russian and Moldovian lands. Concerning this it is worth mentioning that there was no common border between Russia and Moldovian Principality in the XVI century, so negotiants had to transit via Ukraine lands» [10, p. 134].

However there's no Polish and Lithuanian coins in the hoarding. Russian coins have got into the treasure without moving over The Polish Kingdom and The Great Duchy of Lithuania. The kopecks of Ivan IV might get into the South of Bessarabia through the territory of The Ottoman Empire in the Northern Black Sea Coast.

The inflow of Russian kopecks might be contributed by their similarity with turkish akches. Both of them were made of silver, had small size and asymmetrical shape. Russian lower case lettering might be defined by the illiterate population as Turkish one.

It should be noted that Russian and Turkish coins had similar weight standarts. According to the A.S. Mel'nikova's opinion, starting from the 1530-s the monetary circulation of Russia was supplied with 3 types of silver coins: kopecks of 0,68 gr. weight, coins of 0,34 g. and mites of 0,17 gr. [9, p. 29]. The buried treasures discovered on the Moldavian territory represent Turkish akches with the weight from 0,5 to 0,71 gr [11, p. 151–152].

It can be assumed that in the XVI century kopecks and akches were perceived as equal pars.

Basing on everything mentioned above we can make a conclusion that Russian kopecks were kind of admixture to Turkish akches.

The time of final formation of the buried treasure can be detected using the coinage dates of its coins. The eldest coin of the treasure relates to 1481 – 1512 years, the youngest one – to 1543–1592. The

analysis of the composition of the treasure helps to clarify the chronological frames.

Small pars mostly were not clearly dated. The approximate date of coinage can be detected for only 107 akches and 2 kopecks. Among them 13 akches relate to the period before 1520 and 96 coins relate to the period after 1520. There is not a single coin relating to the period after 1584. Most of small par coins were produced before 1566. This makes us think that they have got into the treasure before 1566 or not long after it.

The thalers demonstrate similar chronological situation.

Among 33 thalers the coinage date of 15 ones can't be clearly detected.

5 of the rest 18 thalers relate to the period of 1544–1549, 6 ones – to the period of 1550–1559, 2 ones – to the 1563 year and 5 ones – to the 1564 year.

Among 15 undated clearly coins 2 thalers relate to the XVI century, 7 ones – to the period of 1530–1568, 5 ones – to the period of 1546–1586 and 1 – to the period of 1543–1592.

Thus it can be assumed that the formation of buried treasure have been completed after 1564/1566 year.

Of considerable interest is the value of the treasure in the XVI century. It contained 885 akches, 33 thalers and 2 kopecks. The Turkish coins prevailed by the number, but the value of coins demonstrated reverse situation.

In the XVI century 1 thaler costed 40–60 akches or kopecks [3, p. 260].

The total cost of «western» thalers was 1320-1980 akches, the «turkish» part – 855 akches and the «russian» one – 2 kopecks.

The total cost of the whole treasure was 2207–2867 akches or 48–55 thalers.

In 1530-1550-s in the Moldavian Principality 100 bulls costed 202 thalers [13, p. 82]. Thus the total cost of the treasure was about the cost of 25 bulls.

It can be concluded that the Dmitrovka treasure was hidden by a wealthy man after 1564 year. Its owner was possibly connected to the international trade. The hoarding of the treasure happened in the period of political instability.

In 1564 Alexandr Lapushnyanu (1564–1568) took power in the Moldavian Principality [4, p. 119]. Selim II (1566–1574) took power in Turkey in 1566 [5, p. 279–295; 16]. Both of them have left bad mark in history of their lands. Political troubles could be the reason of that the treasure was not demanded by its owner.

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